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ABSTRACT 
EXPLORING ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICE AUCTIONS 
 
By 
William Bruton Holmes 
August, 2010 
Committee Chair: Dr. James C. Cox 
Major Department: Economics 
The chapters of this dissertation explore related aspects of the procurement of 
conservation services from private landowners.  In the first chapter, heuristic laboratory 
experiments reveal the impact of potential government regulation on strategic forces and 
efficiency properties in conservation procurement auctions.  In the second chapter, data 
from past procurement auctions are analyzed to discover the existence and magnitude of 
premiums received by auction participants.   
The first Chapter, “Procurement Auctions Under Regulatory Threat,” examines 
how strategic forces and efficiency properties are impacted in auctions for the 
procurement of environmental services when a threat of regulation is levied.  Laboratory 
experiments examining different regulatory environments demonstrate that a threat of 
regulation will reduce the amount of public funds necessary to purchase a given level of 
environmental services.  However, adverse selection costs and equity are negatively 
impacted by threat implementation.  
The second Chapter, “Estimating Bid Inflation in Procurement of Environmental 
Services,” studies the size of premiums received by program participants in conservation 
 
 
xiii 
 
programs.  Predictions informed by economic literature and theory elicit the underlying 
value distribution for a unique dataset of procurement auctions.  Average premiums for 
auction participants range from almost 50 percent to less than 1 percent across auction 
periods and institutions.  The results demonstrate that both repetition and rule variation 
may improve the efficiency of procurement auctions.  The auctions studied here are 
shown to yield efficiency improvements of more than 32 percent over standard fixed-
payment schemes for service procurement.  
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Chapter I: Procurement Auctions Under Regulatory Threat 
 
Introduction 
Market institutions are gaining popularity worldwide for use in the procurement 
of environmental services from private landowners.  While the potential benefits of using 
auctions to allocate contracts have been well documented in economic theory (Chan, 
Laplagne, and Appels 2003; Klemperer 1999; Latacz-Lohmann and Hamsvoort 1997, 
1998), research on the use of auctions for the procurement of environmental services is 
still needed.  Procurement auctions for environmental services (PES auctions hereafter) 
have demonstrated promise for reducing rents to landowners that result from the 
information asymmetry  present between agencies that purchase environmental services 
and landowners who provide these services (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi 2005).  This 
asymmetry exists because landowners have better information about their opportunity 
costs of providing services.  Competitive processes used to allocate contracts in auctions 
reduce the incentives for landowners to inflate their opportunity costs relative to the 
incentives they face when traditional fixed payment allocation mechanisms are 
implemented.  While PES auctions have shown improvements over fixed payment 
schemes to contract environmental services, there is empirical and laboratory evidence 
that landowners bid significantly higher than their opportunity costs when participating in 
discriminatory price PES auctions (Cason and Gangadharan 2005; Kirwan, Lubowski, 
and Roberts 2005).  The resulting informational rents awarded to contract winners create 
a need for the allocation of a greater amount of public funds to purchase a given level of 
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environmental services than would be necessary if landowners bid their true opportunity 
costs of providing services. 
Ongoing research programs such as the one conducted by Groth are continuing to 
explore the efficiency properties of PES auctions (Groth 2008).  However, one issue that 
has been left unaddressed in the literature stems from the fact that the procuring agent is 
often a government entity, and consequently, may be empowered with regulatory 
authority by lawmakers.  Indeed, government regulation has a long history of use in the 
United States to prevent activities that are harmful to the public.  Miceli and Segerson 
assert that “courts have long viewed it as a legitimate exercise of the government’s police 
power to ‘regulate’ property without the obligation to pay compensation, provided that 
the intent of the regulation is to protect the ‘health, morals, or safety’ of the community” 
(Miceli and Segerson 1995).  They expand on this concept by saying “actions that limit 
the use of but do not physically acquire property have generally been viewed as non-
compensable.”  Clearly there are cases in which the land management practices of private 
landowners may adversely affect the health, morals, and safety of other members of a 
community.  Some common examples of these situations are as follows.  One may be 
found if a landowner over-extracts from a publicly owned environmental stock, such as a 
river or aquifer, thereby reducing availability to other community members.  Another 
could arise from a landowner’s decision to remove critical habitat for endangered species.  
Still other situations might stem from pesticide usage, manure storage, or other 
production practices employed by landowners.   
As mentioned above, it is within the power of a government to impose regulations 
to preserve or increase environmental goods.  This chapter examines how strategic forces 
3 
 
 
 
and efficiency properties are impacted in auctions for the procurement of environmental 
services when a threat of regulation is levied.  Laboratory experiments are conducted to 
reveal characteristics of bidder behavior in different regulatory environments.  The 
experiments provide insight into the efficiency-equity tradeoffs inherent in regulatory 
policy applications with respect to the use of procurement auctions for environmental 
services.  Results indicate that it is possible to reduce the amount of public funds 
necessary to purchase a given level of environmental services by using an explicit threat 
of regulation in PES auctions.  Ceteris paribus, this outcome represents an efficiency gain 
and improvement in the performance of the auction by increasing the amount of services 
that may be contracted within a given budget, thereby reducing the need for a 
government to collect distortionary taxes.  However, adverse selection costs and equity 
considerations that arise from levying a regulatory threat may outstrip the potential 
benefits gained by paying lower prices to service providers.      
The next section of this chapter contains a detailed presentation of background 
information and motivation for the exploration of this topic.   
Background and Motivation 
A PES auction is defined as a procurement auction in which one buyer (usually a 
government entity) seeks to ensure that a certain amount of environmental services are 
obtained from a group of landowners (often farmers).1  Landowners that participate in a 
PES auction bid dollar amounts they are willing to accept from the government in return 
                                                 
1 Fishermen and other resource users are also potential providers of environmental services.  In their case, 
the environmental services provided consist of use permits that are purchased at auction by the 
conservation agent.   
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for maintaining a certain ecosystem to agreed-upon rules.  From an efficiency standpoint, 
the landowner's bids should reflect their true opportunity costs for providing the 
environmental services.  However, contractual relationships arrived at through this 
bidding process are subject to asymmetries of hidden information and hidden action.  
Both asymmetries enable landowners to achieve rents, or windfall gains, from the 
conservation agent by either inflating their bids or failing to perform the services they are 
contracted to provide.  While each asymmetry creates inefficiency with regard to the 
provision of environmental services, this analysis will focus on the former (hidden 
information).2 
Hidden information becomes a problem when the opportunity cost of providing a 
particular environmental service varies across landowners.  Auction theory predicts that 
bidders will weigh the amount at which they inflate their bid (the windfall gain from 
winning a contract in the auction), against the probability that their bid will be accepted 
when formulating bids in multiple unit discriminatory price auctions (Cox, Smith, and 
Walker 1984; Vickrey 1962).  Shoemaker’s early analysis (Shoemaker 1989) of the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the largest PES initiative in the U.S., finds 
evidence of informational rents going to landowners.  Further study of the CRP by 
Kirwan et al. quantifies windfall gains in the CRP as constituting between 10 and 40 
percent of total contract values in 2002-2003 signup periods, the most recent of their 
sample (Kirwan, Lubowski, and Roberts 2005).  Additionally, the Economist’s 
(Economist 1999)  report on the California Headwater Forest purchase and Osterberg’s 
                                                 
2 Cox et al. provide an informative analysis of both information asymmetries in the context of government 
procurement from private contractors who may engage in costly effort to reduce overall costs of service 
provision (Cox et al. 1996).  
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analysis (Osterberg 1999) of a German agri-environment payment program both contain 
further support for informational rents going to landowners. 
Informational rents to landowners are an important problem because they 
generally come at the expense of tax dollars.  Since distortionary tax collections are often 
used to compensate landowners for providing environmental services, taxpayers will 
benefit if the payments to landowners are equal to the landowners' opportunity costs of 
contract compliance, but no more than these costs (Ferraro 2008). 
As mentioned in the introduction, an important aspect of PES auctions that is 
usually kept in the background if mentioned at all in the relevant literature is the fact that 
the conservation agent is usually a government agency, and the government has the 
power to order the implementation of ecosystem management practices if lawmakers 
chose to empower the government agency in such a way.  Consider the case of a local 
river basin that supports a thriving ecosystem of plants and animals while serving as the 
primary water supply for a local community.  Additionally, assume the river is also used 
by local farmers who extract water to irrigate their crops.  Next, consider what might 
happen if biologists determine that a severe drought will dry up the river and destroy the 
ecosystem if farmers continue to irrigate their crops in a specific year.  In comparable 
situations, such as in the Flint River Basin of Georgia (U.S.A.), the government decided 
to implement a PES auction to purchase enough of the water rights back from farmers so 
that the ecosystem and water supply were protected for the year (Cummings, Holt, and 
Laury 2004; Laury 2002).  If farmers had inflated their bids (in essence, claiming that 
their opportunity costs were higher than they really were), then the government would 
have spent more taxpayer money than was socially optimal to contract with the farmers to 
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suspend irrigation.  One possible alternative the government could have pursued was to 
simply have told the farmers that they were forbidden from irrigating crops in the drought 
year, and then enforced the restriction through monitoring and strict fines.  This second 
alternative seems problematic from both a political standpoint (politicians generally avoid 
being perceived as treating farmers unfairly) and from an efficiency point of view (by 
forcing a heavier portion of the burden of the drought onto the farmers than is socially 
optimal).  Another alternative that combines both scenarios mentioned above is for the 
government to issue a regulatory threat, i.e., notifying farmers that if the sum of their bids 
exceeds the government’s budget allocation for the auction (determined by the 
distribution of farmer’s opportunity costs), then their irrigation rights would be suspended 
without compensation.3  In this way, the government may be able to induce enough 
farmers to lower their bids to a level equal to their opportunity cost, so that enough of the 
irrigation rights may be purchased at an efficient price.  Of course, other outcomes of 
such a regulatory threat are possible.  For example, the allocational efficiency of the 
auction could be adversely impacted by the issuance of a threat if the lowest cost service 
providers are not selected.  This could occur if higher cost service providers decrease 
their bids more than lower cost providers because the higher cost providers have more to 
lose in the event of a regulation.  An even worse case from an efficiency-equity 
perspective might occur if the budget allocation is exceeded, thereby triggering the threat 
and causing services to be “taken” without compensation.  That outcome would ignore all 
heterogeneity in costs across service providers and represent a situation in which a 
                                                 
3 The form of regulation in which all contracts are taken without compensation represents a boundary case 
that seems to be a logical place to begin the analysis of the impact of threatened regulation on bidding 
behavior.  Of course, there are many different permutations and forms of regulatory threats and 
consequences that could be tested in future laboratory sessions.   
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heavier portion of the burden of the drought than is socially optimal is forced onto the 
farmers.  
A less politically sensitive case to motivate this analysis arises from the presence 
of bio-physical thresholds in certain procurement situations.  Consider a section of river 
that travels through the property of many different landowners.  Consider further that the 
government agency (or conservation agent) charges landowners a fee based on their 
riverfront acreage to dredge the river every few years in order to mitigate the effects of 
erosion stemming from their land management practices along the riverside.  It may be 
possible to reduce erosion through the collective action of many different landowners, 
thereby eliminating the need for periodic dredging.  In such a case, landowners have the 
option of implementing erosion control land-management practices along the river to 
avoid having it dredged.  A conservation agent could conduct an auction to purchase 
contracts to ensure that areas of riverfront are managed in accordance with specified 
erosion control practices.  If the agent is not able to contract riverfront lands beyond the 
threshold level to avoid dredging within a specific budget (for example, the total cost of 
the next anticipated dredging of the river), then the agent would simply refuse all bids 
and charge the previously mentioned fee for the necessary dredging.  Note how this is 
different from the case of having a maximum reserve price in the auction since 
landowners will actually suffer a loss in the form of the dredging fee if the agent is 
unable to contract the threshold level of land.  However, this problem is analytically 
similar to the case of using a regulatory threat to reduce bid inflation among PES auction 
participants.  Here, the dredging fee is congruent with the idea of a “regulatory threat.”  
Therefore, one would expect individual bids in the auction to be lower than they would 
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be if there were no consequences for a failure to contract the threshold level of riverfront 
within a given budget.    
Finally, consider the case of a PES auction to protect an overexploited fishery.  
Here, the conservation agent seeks to purchase enough permits from users of the fishery 
to meet an environmental objective.   Consider further that there is already an ongoing 
political debate about possible future regulatory actions that may be used to protect the 
fishery.  In this case, many participants in the auction may internalize an inexplicit 
regulatory threat.  That is to say, auction participants may be aware that regulatory action 
(such as the imposition of a fishing ban or technological restriction) has a higher 
probability of occurring if the amount of permits purchased within the budget allocated to 
the auction is insufficient to protect the fishery.  Even though this threat is not explicitly 
levied by the conservation agent, it would certainly be expected to affect bidding 
behavior in the auction.   The experiments reported in this chapter shed light on the 
nature and magnitude of the effects of threatened regulation in auctions, along with 
providing predictions about the outcomes of such auctions.    
The next section provides a discussion of the relevant empirical and theoretical 
literature on PES auctions.  There is also a review of the primary legal precedents for 
environmental regulation in the United States.  
Literature Review 
"An auction is a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining 
resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from market participants" (McAfee and 
McMillan 1987).  It is fairly clear that auctions have certain properties that are useful in 
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the provision of environmental services.  Participants are able to deal with uncertainty 
about the value of such services by allowing the auction institution to determine whether 
or not a contract is accepted.  While this has been recognized as a useful way to lower 
informational rents to service providers (Latacz-Lohmann and Hamsvoort 1997), there is 
evidence that the auction mechanism alone is insufficient for eliminating all 
informational rents.  Cason and Gangadharan provide evidence of this persistent problem 
in laboratory experiments using both uniform and discriminative price auctions (Cason 
and Gangadharan 2005).  In their experiments, the sealed bid discriminatory price auction 
institution allows the buyer to purchase a larger quantity of services than the sealed bid 
uniform price auction.  However, they find evidence of at least 8 percent bid inflation 
(meaning that bids to provide the services are at least 8 percent higher than the 
opportunity costs of service provision) in most offers.  The previously mentioned work 
by Kirwan et al. finds further evidence of substantial bid inflation in CRP auctions 
(Kirwan, Lubowski, and Roberts 2005).  They estimate inflation levels of between 11 and 
67 percent in the most recent periods of their sample (2002-2003).   
Theoretical predictions of bid inflation in auctions have been constructed 
beginning with Vickrey’s formulations of Nash equilibrium bidding behavior in both 
single unit and multiple unit auctions for risk neutral economic agents (Vickrey 1961; 
Vickrey 1962).  Harris and Raviv (HR) extended Vickrey’s model to explain behavior in 
multiple unit auctions where all bidders have the same individual concave utility function 
and values are drawn from a general distribution function (Harris and Raviv 1981).  The 
equilibrium bid function from HR for risk neutral agents was later converted into the 
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form of computable finite polynomials by Cox, Smith, and Walker (Cox, Smith et al. 
1984).   
Later work by Latacz-Lohmann and Hamsvoort, presents a theoretical model 
designed specifically for conservation auctions (Latacz-Lohmann and Hamsvoort 1997).  
They find that the auction mechanism does improve the efficiency of contracting for 
environmental services over traditional fixed-payment schemes used by conservation 
agents.  However, they acknowledge the fact that it is difficult for their theory to “provide 
a cut and dried solution in most real-world settings” because of relaxed assumptions and 
simplifications.  While these theoretical pieces are relevant to this analysis, there is no 
existing model to predict the outcome of auctions conducted in an environment which 
contains a threat of regulation.  It is here where the experiments reported in this chapter 
may be used to push this frontier of knowledge and inform more sophisticated theories.         
PES auctions have already been conducted in the U.S., Australia, the United 
Kingdom, and other European nations.  Various environmental objectives, such as 
increasing biodiversity, reducing dryland salinity, protecting groundwater, and extending 
wildlife habitat have been targeted in these auctions (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi 
2005).  Markus Groth of the University of Luneburg is conducting a research program to 
formulate a comparative study of conservation auctions.  His empirical work strives to 
expand our understanding of this innovative environmental policy instrument (Groth 
2008).   
Cummings, Holt, and Laury make an important contribution to the literature in a 
paper which depicts the design process and execution of an auction for irrigation permits 
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in the Flint River basin of Georgia (Cummings, Holt, and Laury 2004).  After 
experimenting in both the laboratory and the field, CHL recommended that the regulatory 
authority use a first price sealed bid discriminatory price auction with multiple rounds of 
bid revisions to secure a certain level of irrigation suspension in the Flint River Basin.  
The auction mechanism induced farmers to decrease offers over time and was considered 
a success even though certain aspects of the auction design (namely the enforcement of 
constraints by state officials, i.e., fixed budget, acreage target, average price, and 
maximum accepted price constraints) differed between experimental design and real-
world implementation.  The choice of a discriminatory price auction instead of a uniform 
price auction in CHL is supported by findings in experiments by Cason and Gangadharan 
(Cason and Gangadharan 2005).  Their laboratory procurement auctions compared a 
discriminatory price institution with a second price uniform auction institution.  CG 
found that even though sellers’ bids were not significantly different from their costs in 
second price uniform auction treatments, there was a substantial inefficiency in 
procurement.  This was because each successful seller received the price per unit of the 
first rejected bid (as is customary in the uniform price multiunit generalization of the 
second price auction).  Because prices exceeded costs, some inefficiency occurred.  At 
the same time, their discriminative price auction experiments showed smaller differences 
in the amount that successful sellers were “overpaid.”  For these reasons, the 
discriminatory first price auction was chosen for use in the experimental design presented 
in this analysis.    
There is also a relevant thread from the pollution literature that examines how 
political pressure can change the effect of taxes and subsidies on polluting industries.  
12 
 
 
 
Finkelshtain and Kislev have a theoretical model which accounts for the reality of 
political influences by inserting contributions from industry participants into the 
politician’s objective function (Finkelshtain and Kislev 2004).  FK show that when 
producers are politically active and politicians are willingly influenced, welfare-
maximizing policies (such as a pollution tax or a pollution abatement subsidy) will not 
achieve the maximum level of social welfare.  Along these lines, the pollution control 
literature also studies the effects of monitoring and enforcement on polluter compliance.  
Glaeser and Schleifer (Glaeser and Schleifer 2003) highlight the importance of 
enforcement costs to industry regulation, while identifying conditions under which 
regulatory action may be an efficient remedy for market failure.  In their model, GS 
associate the choice to pursue a regulatory strategy with the “vulnerability of law 
enforcement in a country to subversion by powerful interests that might be affected.”  
Their model implies that regulatory actions become increasingly efficient tools for 
dealing with market failures in countries where the government has a firm grip on power, 
and bureaucrats are not easily swayed by special interests.  These avenues of the 
literature are mentioned here in an attempt at completeness, but they will be largely put 
aside in the following analysis.  This is because the incorporation of both monitoring 
costs and political processes would introduce unnecessary levels of complexity in the 
analysis of bidding behavior in PES auctions under regulatory threat.  Nevertheless, they 
are worth mentioning as future work in the area could begin to account for these 
considerations. 
In addition to reviewing the literature with respect to PES auctions, it is also 
helpful to trace the history of regulation in the United States.  Such a discussion would 
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begin with the eminent domain clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  
This clause empowers the government to seize private property, or rights in property, for 
public use provided that it pays “just compensation.”  According to Miceli and Segerson, 
it has long been viewed by courts that it is a legitimate exercise of the government’s 
power to regulate property without the obligation to pay compensation as long as the 
regulation is to protect the “health, morals, and safety” of the community.  While 
government actions that result in the physical acquisition of private property are 
established as seizures for which compensation must be paid, actions that simply limit the 
use of property, but do not physically acquire it, have generally been viewed as 
noncompensable.  Others such as Epstein argue that instead of being noncompensable, 
government regulation should be viewed as a physical acquisition of property and 
therefore a seizure of private property, or “taking”, under the eminent domain clause 
(Epstein 1985).  However, Epstein is consistent with Miceli and Segerson in his belief 
that the prevailing interpretation of the law in this area is powerfully skewed in favor of 
government regulation.  Epstein cautions that the current interpretation of government 
regulation on the disposition of private lands modifies the incentives of those in power by 
reducing their willingness to take and pay for land for public use.  In essence, the political 
group in control, can get what they want at reduced expenditure of their own wealth 
through regulation.  There are several important legal doctrines that have supported 
policies of noncompensable government regulation through the years beginning with 
Mugler v. Kansas (1887).4  That case decision established the “noxious use” doctrine 
which states that no seizure occurs when the government acts to prevent activities that are 
harmful to the public.  This doctrine was overturned 35 years later in the case of 
                                                 
4 123 U.S. 623 (1887) 
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Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922).5  There, Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes ruled 
that “a regulation that ‘goes too far’ in reducing the value of the owner’s property 
becomes a taking, regardless of its purpose (Miceli and Segerson 1995).”  Holmes 
suggested that the specifics of ‘going too far’ should be decided on a case by case basis, 
and that the status quo view of regulation was such that no such taking occurs and 
compensation is unnecessary (Epstein 1985).  Later, in Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. City of New York (1978),6 the Supreme Court proposed that the character of the 
government action, the impact of the action on the property owner, and the regulation’s 
impact on “investment-backed expectations” of the property owner were each important 
in determining whether or not compensation should be paid in response to a regulatory 
action.  Finally, in Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council (1992),7 the Court’s decision 
took the position that a seizure is compensable if it renders a property valueless, unless 
the regulation is aimed at preventing an activity that would not be allowed under the 
state’s common law of nuisance.  This exception for nuisances means that compensation 
is not due for regulations that prevent nuisances as defined by a state’s common law 
standards. 
The next section of the chapter contains a detailed description of the experimental 
design employed in the laboratory sessions. 
                                                 
5 260 U.S. 393 (1922) 
6 438 U.S. 104 (1978) 
7 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) 
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Experimental Design 
One of the most persuasive reasons to use laboratory experiments to investigate 
the effect of a regulatory threat on bidding behavior in PES auctions stems from the fact 
that the experiments may indeed help policymakers avoid costly mistakes from 
unpredicted outcomes of regulation.  An experiment can provide insight into the bidding 
behavior in procurement auctions under threat of regulation.  This leads to the central 
questions we seek to answer through experimentation:  What are the impacts on the 
strategic forces and on final contract allocations when a threat of regulation is levied in a 
PES auction?  Can a regulatory threat reduce informational rents to landowners and 
thereby allow for the needed level of service provision to be achieved at an efficient cost?  
And finally, what efficiency-equity tradeoffs are associated with imposing the regulatory 
threat in this type of institution. 
Overview: 
The experiment is run with groups of representative landowners containing N=11 
individuals.  This was to ensure that group size was large enough to provide the subjects 
with a complex bidding environment comparable to those found in the field.  Each group 
of subjects participates in several treatments of a procurement auction.  Treatments are 
varied to incorporate three regulatory environments ranging from complete absence of a 
threat to a level where there is a strong expectation for regulation to occur.  While the 
experiment is designed to mimic a real-world procurement auction between landowners 
and conservation agents, there is little if any role-playing involved, as subjects are only 
given the information in their instructions to behave as sellers of a fictitious commodity. 
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The experiment proceeds as follows.  Each participant enters the lab and is seated 
at a computer.  The General Background instructions are next to the computer so that the 
subjects may begin reading silently to themselves (see the appendix for a copy of all 
printed instructions).  Once the background instructions are read, the Regular Auction 
(Treatment 1) instructions are handed out.  Then there is a question and answer period.  
Next, subjects participate in several rounds of the Regular Auction treatment.  This 
process is repeated for the remaining High Budget Auction and Low Budget Auction 
treatments.  Before each new set of instructions are handed out, the old ones are 
collected.  Subjects have the opportunity to raise their hands to ask questions at any time 
but are restricted from talking among themselves during the experiment.   
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show sample screenshots of the bidding phases in the 
Regular and High Budget Auction Treatments.  In every auction, each subject is told that 
they are acting as the seller of a fictitious commodity.  They are given a computer 
generated randomly drawn commodity value between 3 and 10.  This is analogous to the 
opportunity cost of implementing the environmental service in a PES auction.  Next, the 
subject is asked to enter a bid between 1 and 20 into the computer to sell his commodity.  
The computer program orders the bids from all players and then performs calculations to 
determine which if any bids are accepted and whether or not the regulatory threat is 
imposed.  A review screen then appears for subjects to give them feedback on the 
outcome of the auction.  If the regulatory threat is realized, each player’s payoff for that 
auction is zero.  If the threat is not realized, then the lowest 6 bidders earn points equal to 
the amount of their bids, while the others earn points equal to their randomly drawn 
commodity values.  Sample screenshots of the High Budget Auction Treatment bidding 
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phase, Regular Auction Treatment review phase, and subject questionnaire are contained 
in Appendix A. 
 
Figure 1: Regular Auction Treatment Screenshot 
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Figure 2. High Budget Review Phase in Period 8 
 
To ensure saliency of the reward system, subjects are notified in advance that 
each point they earn in an auction period is to be exchanged for $1.00 at the end of the 
experiment if that period is chosen for final payoff using a bingo cage.  As explained in 
the General Background instructions, one period from each auction treatment is drawn 
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for final payoff.  The decision to select one period from each treatment for payoff was 
made to increase the likelihood that subjects bid independently in each round.  As a 
consequence, the maximum possible amount of money awarded to any subject in the 
experiment is $60 (reflecting the unlikely case where 20 points is earned in each of the 
three chosen periods).  The reward system is designed under the assumption that subjects 
are trying to maximize their earnings.  Complete subject instructions are included in 
Appendix B. 
Treatments: 
The following is a brief description of each of the auction treatments that are 
administered during the experiment.   
1. Regular procurement auction (R).  In this treatment which is run at the beginning 
and end of the experiment, the lowest 6 bidders receive points equal to their bids 
while the remaining bidders receive points equal to their value draws for the 
period. 
2. High Budget procurement auction (H). Subjects are told the computer’s total level 
of expenditure to accept the lowest 6 bids is randomly drawn from [36-40]. 
3. Low Budget procurement auction (L).  Subjects are told the computer’s total level 
of expenditure to accept the lowest 6 bids is randomly drawn from [26-30]. 
In each of the threat treatments, if the lowest 6 bids sum to less than or equal to a 
number randomly drawn from a uniform distribution within the range shown above, i.e., 
[26-30] in the case of treatment 3, then the lowest 6 bidders earn points for the period 
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equal to their bids while the remaining 5 bidders earn points for the period equal to their 
commodity values.  In the event that the expenditure limit is broken, all payoffs are zero.  
It should be noted that the information conditions are such that subjects are only informed 
of the uniform distribution from which the expenditure limit is drawn.   
The threat implemented in these experiments is that every bidder will earn zero 
points if the budget is exceeded.  This case is well-suited for our research objective to 
observe changes in strategic behavior as a result of the threat.  If instead we chose a threat 
with similar but less severe consequences, then we may expect to observe similar changes 
in strategic behavior, but with a lesser magnitude.  The threat studied here is also 
analogous to situations occurring in the natural environment.  For example, it is common 
for regulators to ban all resource users from extracting from a particular fishery to protect 
from overharvesting, such as in the California salmon fishery in 2008 and 2009 
(Davidson 2010).  Faced with a ban, all permits and stamps for the salmon fishery were 
rendered valueless (CDFG 2010), and all profits from commercial fishing for California 
salmon were zero.  Of course, our design of the threat does not apply to all potential 
regulatory situations, and other interesting permutations exist which could be explored in 
future laboratory sessions. 
The expenditure limits in the H and L treatments are based on the expectation of 
the value distribution and are chosen to reflect different regulatory environments.  In the 
H treatment, the expenditure limit range is chosen to be around  40 percent higher than 
the expectation of the value distribution (here, the expectation of the value distribution is 
the expectation of the sum of the lowest 6 out of 11 values randomly drawn between ‘3’ 
and ‘10’ = 29.10).  The 40 percent increase above the value distribution expectation in H 
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treatment auctions is meant to reflect a fairly lenient regulatory environment.  On the 
other hand, the L treatment expenditure limit range of 26-30 encompasses the 
aforementioned expectation of the value distribution of 29.10.  This limit is meant to 
reflect a strict regulatory environment. 
The expenditure ranges for the threat treatments are summarized in Table 1.  In 
addition to being stated in the instructions, the relevant range appears on the bidding 
screen during each period of the experiment. 
Table 1. Expenditure Ranges for Threat Treatments 
Group Size           Threat level for treatment H        Threat level for treatment L 
N=11 [36,40] [26,30] 
 
Clearly, the incentives faced by bidders are altered in each of the three treatments.  
In the R treatment, sellers face a more traditional auction situation in which they try to 
maximize the utility gained from winning points above their value times the probability 
of winning in the auction.  More formally, max( − 	
) ∗ ().  
Here it would be irrational to enter a bid below one’s value.  In the H and L treatments, 
the incentives change dramatically when the possibility of earning zero points is 
introduced.  Here the sellers maximize utility gained from the number of points they 
would earn if they retain their value and there is no intervention plus the premium they 
would earn from a winning bid.  More formally, 
max(	
) ∗ ( ) +  ( − 	
) ∗ ().  As 
the amount bid decreases, the probability of not having an intervention increases and the 
probability of winning increases.  Therefore, there may be an incentive for sellers to 
actually bid below their values, particularly in the L treatment, in order to reduce the 
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probability of triggering an intervention which would ensure they earn zero points for the 
auction.       
The ordering of the threat treatments is varied across sessions.  For odd numbered 
sessions (I and III):  (1,2,3,1); for even numbered sessions (II and IV): (1,3,2,1).  Each 
sequence begins with an R treatment auction.  Then a varying series of threat treatments 
is administered, with a return to the R treatment at the end.  This ordering establishes a 
baseline for subject behavior in an auction process without regulatory threat.  Then, the 
threat treatment order is varied across sessions to help in the identification of effects that 
might arise from either starting with a severe threat and then relaxing the expenditure 
constraint, or beginning with a relaxed expenditure constraint and then tightening it in 
subsequent auctions.   
Groups complete seven periods of each treatment before changing to the next 
auction type, for a total of 28 auction periods.  Thirty minutes is spent reading 
instructions and answering questions.   Each auction period lasts approximately one 
minute.  Also, it takes approximately ten minutes for subjects to answer the 
questionnaire.  Therefore, each session of the experiment may be completed in less than 
1.5 hours.   
Data generated by these treatments consists of all bids and payoffs from every 
auction.  Analysis yields interesting comparisons between bidder behavior in the R 
auction treatment with behavior in the H and L threat treatment auctions.  An inflation 
measure is calculated for each auction including those where the regulatory threat was 
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realized by ordering the bids (1,…,n) from lowest to highest and using the following 
formula: 

	 =    ! "#  ! "#  
The inflation measure captures the ratio of the sum of the lowest 6 bids () and hence the 
potential expenditures for the government to achieve its objective of 6 contracts, relative 
to the total values (), analogous to opportunity costs, that are available to subjects for 
keeping their commodities.  Therefore, an inflation level of one would indicate the 
achievement, on average, of the outcome where contract prices are equal to opportunity 
costs.  This measurement captures bid inflation as an individual property, but it is not 
capable of finding inefficiency arising from socially suboptimal agents winning the 
auction. 
 Another measure of auction performance may be constructed to determine the 
amount by which the total cost to the buyer exceeds the lowest possible cost of providing 
the same amount of services across all sellers.  This measure, called “total inflation” may 
be constructed in the following way:  
$	
 
	 =  %    ! "# ∀  %     ∀ ! "#  
In the above equation, the sum of the lowest six bids () is compared with the sum of the 
lowest six value () draws in each round.  This broader measure of auction performance 
compares the winning bids in the auction with the lowest possible costs of service 
provision across all potential providers.  A total inflation score of one would indicate the 
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achievement, on average, of the outcome where contract prices are equal to the lowest 
possible opportunity costs across service providers.  While this measure does a better job 
than the first inflation measure of capturing any deviation from the optimal social cost 
paid by the buyer in each auction, it is still inadequate for measuring inefficiencies 
arising from adverse selection of service providers.  That problem will be addressed with 
a separate analysis of the efficiency properties of the different threat treatments with 
respect to the optimal allocation of contracts to the lowest cost providers.  
Further analysis of the data incorporates econometric tests of bid inflation levels 
within and between subjects.  Learning effects are studied by comparing the results from 
sequential auctions in each treatment.   
In addition to comparisons of bidding behavior across treatments, we will also test 
how well existing theory predicts actual bidding behavior in the R treatment auctions.  
The analysis will compare R auction data with the theoretical prediction formulated for a 
risk neutral bidder in Cox, Smith, and Walker.  They provide a Nash equilibrium bid 
function for an auction with the following properties.8  Each bidder  = 1, … , * submits 
a bid  to purchase a single unit, and the Q highest bidders win (note how this is the 
reverse of the experimental auctions, where each bidder submits a bid to sell a single unit, 
and the Q lowest bidders win).  The parameter  is the bidder’s underlying value, while + 
reflects the bidder’s belief of the highest underlying value held among all auction 
participants.  In the above formula, participants construct their bids by evaluating the 
probability that at least N-Q other bids will be lower than their own bids.  The reverse is 
true in procurement auctions where participants construct their bids by evaluating the 
                                                 
8 See pages 984-985 of CSW, 1984 for the relevant formula and a complete exposition of the proof.   
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probability that at least N-Q of the other bids will be higher than their own bids.  Figure 3 
depicts the theoretical prediction of bids for the treatment 1 parameterization.  Double 
arrows are drawn to indicate how the difference between bids and values are related for 
traditional and reverse auction predictions.  In the traditional auction, buyers at the lower 
end of the value distribution are predicted to shave their bids by the same amount that 
sellers at the higher end of the value distribution are predicted to inflate their bid in a 
reverse auction.   
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Figure 3. Predicted Bidding 
 
One potential weakness of this experiment stems from the use of $1.00 bid 
increments.  This may be too large of an increment to capture all of the subtlety in bidder 
behavior.  Furthermore, the theory to predict bidding in R auctions is formulated in 
continuous space, a factor which will be addressed in the results section.  In spite of these 
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weaknesses, we believe the $1.00 bid increment is a convenient simplification that helps 
to reduce subject confusion. 
Data from four experimental sessions are reported in the next section.    
Experimental Data and Results 
The experiment was programmed and conducted using the Ztree software 
(Fischbacher 2007).  All forty-four subjects were recruited from the undergraduate 
student population at Georgia State University.  Both male and female subjects with ages 
ranging from 19 to 29 participated in the session.  The experiment took place in the 
Experimental Economics Laboratory located within the Experimental Economics Center 
of the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at GSU.  Data generated in the 
experiment consist of 28 bids for each subject, yielding a total of 1232 observations.  
Subjects also provided answers to a questionnaire at the end of the experiment (see the 
appendix for a screenshot of the questionnaire).  In accordance with the protocol, the 
treatment ordering was (1,2,3,1) for Sessions I and III, and (1,3,2,1) for Sessions II and 
IV.   
Summary statistics presented in Table 2 are separated between the Regular (R) 
auction treatment, High Budget (H) auction treatment, and Low Budget (L) auction 
treatment.  It is clear that the mean bid and mean inflation increment (calculated as bid-
value) were much lower on average in the auctions that were run with some level of 
threat.  In particular, the mean bid in R auctions exceeded the mean value by 2.87.  This 
may be compared with a mean bid in the H treatment that was only 2.07 higher than the 
mean value, and a mean bid in the L treatment that was only 1.12 higher than the mean 
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value.  Similarly, the percentage of bid inflation equal to (bid-value)/value decreased 
from a mean of .56 in the R treatment to .42 and .21 in the H and L treatments 
respectively.  It is also interesting to note that the average winning bid of 7.71 in the R 
auctions fell to 6.17 in H auctions and 4.98 in the L auctions.  Finally, the binary 
intervention variable shows that interventions occurred in 36 percent (10 out of 28) of H 
auctions and 46 percent (13 out of 28) of L auctions.   
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Full Sample 
Regular Treatments 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Value 616 6.48 2.23 3 10 
Bid 616 9.35 2.62 1 20 
Average Winning Bid 336 7.71 1.63 1 11 
Inflation Increment 616 2.87 2.16 -4 13 
Percent Inflation 616 0.56 0.55 -0.67 4 
Highest Bid 56 13.86 2.57 10 20 
Lowest Bid 56 5.54 1.83 1 8 
High Budget Treatments 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Value 308 6.35 2.24 3 10 
Bid 308 8.43 3.84 2 20 
Average Winning Bid 168 6.17 1.25 2 9 
Inflation Increment 308 2.07 3.50 -6 16 
Percent Inflation 308 0.42 0.67 -0.625 4 
Highest Bid 28 15.57 4.41 10 20 
Lowest Bid 28 4.61 0.94 2 6 
High Budget 28 37.64 1.74 36 40 
Intervention 28 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Low Budget Treatments 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Value 308 6.68 2.16 3 10 
Bid 308 7.80 4.86 1 20 
Average Winning Bid 168 4.98 1.71 1 14 
Inflation Increment 308 1.12 4.47 -9 17 
Percent Inflation 308 0.21 0.70 -0.9 5.67 
Highest Bid 28 15.57 4.83 8 20 
Lowest Bid 28 2.93 1.00 1 5 
Low Budget 28 28.14 1.75 26 30 
Intervention 28 0.46 0.50 0 1 
 
Data from the questionnaire regarding subject understanding reveals that all of the 
subjects found the instructions to be clear.  However, one subject in Session I reported a 
lack of understanding in the beginning of the experiment that the least amount of points 
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she could earn in the R auctions was her commodity value.  As a consequence, the 
subject bid below her value in the early periods (in fact, her bid was only one point in two 
of the first 7 R auction periods).  The subject then realized her error when reading the H 
treatment instructions and subsequently changed her behavior for the remainder of the 
experiment.  Fortunately, robustness checks including and excluding Session I 
observations have ensured that enough data has been gathered so that the outlier behavior 
of one subject does not exert a substantial influence on the experimental results.  For this 
reason, no observations have been excluded from this analysis. 
Figure 4 depicts a summary graph of auction outcomes in all sessions across all 
auction periods.  Here, the treatment ordering in Sessions II and IV are renumbered 
(periods 8-14 are changed to 15-21 and vice-versa) for the sake of convenience.  Charts 
of individual session results are contained in the appendix.  The summary graph shows 
both the average procurement payment paid and the lowest possible opportunity cost for 
each of the 28 auction periods.  Because the same random value draws in Session I were 
implemented for all other sessions, the line representing the sum of the minimum six 
values does not change across sessions.  Note that the Regular auction treatment periods 
(1-7 and 22-28) have the highest procurement payments.  It is clear from the graph that 
procurement costs were considerably lower in the H and L treatments.  Also, payments 
appear to roughly track the value draws in each period.  This indicates that some subjects 
may inflate their bids by a fixed percentage of their costs.  Further econometric tests 
explore this relationship later in the chapter.  Finally, it should be noted from the 
summary graph that the six lowest value draws in four out of seven of the L periods were 
higher than the possible range of the budget draw (26-30).  In those periods, it would be 
  
necessary for the average winning bidder to submit a bid below their value in order for 
the threat to be avoided.  Somewhat surprisingly, this behavior occurred on many 
occasions.   
Figure 4. Summary Graph of Auction Outcomes
 
Next, Figure 5 shows a plot of the inflation increment (bid
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Figure 5. Inflation Increment for All Decisions
 
Looking at Figure
R treatment.  However, there are many bids equal to or below values in the H and L 
treatments.  In fact, there appear
increment is equal to zero in both of these treatments.  A zero inflation increment 
corresponds to an instance where the landowner would bid exactly his opportunity cost to 
provide the conservation ser
there are observations of extraordinarily high inflation increments (those that are between 
10 and 17 points), in the H and L treatments.  These observations are significant outliers 
 
 
 5, it is apparent that bids are almost always above values in the 
 to be quite a few observations in which the inflation 
vice to the government.  Finally, it is important to note that 
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from the mean levels of bid inflation observed in these treatment periods.  Further 
investigation of these observations reveals that they are the result of a few subjects 
bidding the maximum 20 points in several of the H and L periods.  Figure 6 depicts a 
frequency diagram of each subject’s bid of 20 in all auction treatments.  It is apparent 
from the diagram that four subjects in Session III and three subjects in Session IV were 
responsible for most of the 20 point bids.  Indeed, subject number 25 bid 20 points in all 
seven L treatment periods and in three out of seven H treatment periods.  Survey 
responses from these subjects indicate that they understood the auction rules and were 
simply bidding the maximum in order to secure their commodity value in the event that 
the threat was avoided.  None of the survey responses indicate that bids of 20 were made 
as signals to protest the auction institution as was first suspected by the author.       
  
Figure 6. Frequency of Bid = 20
 
Figure 7 shows a scatterplot of the inflation increment for the winners (defined as 
those with the lowest six bids) in each treatment.  Observations 1
first seven R auctions for 
auctions, and 505-672 to the final seven R auctions.  From the graph it is clear that bid 
inflation was highest in the R periods and lowest in the L periods.  Here the trend in 
Figure 5 reappears but is more pronounced in magnitude.  Winners in the L auctions 
often bid at a level equal to or below their value.  This happened with less frequency in 
the H auctions and almost never in the R auctions.  Also, there are many observations in 
the R auctions in which the inflation increment is four or greater, while that rarely 
occurred in the H and L treatments.  
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Figure 7. Inflation Increment f
 
After examining the summary data, it becomes apparent that in addition to 
analyzing the entire dataset as a whole, it may also be useful to look at two subgroups.  
The first subgroup consists of all bids in every auction except for those eq
maximum of 20.  Excluding bids equal to 20 in this subgroup (the ex
allow for a closer observation of bidding behavior by the majority of subjects who did not 
raise their bids to the maximum in order to secure their commodity valu
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Another natural subgroup of bids that warrants closer examination is one that consists 
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subgroup will allow for an analysis of the behavior and characteristics of those 
participants who were able to successfully sell their unit.  Descriptive statistics of these 
two subgroups are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Ex-20 and Winner Subgroups 
  Regular   High   Low 
  Obs Mean St.Dev.   Obs Mean  St.Dev   Obs Mean St.Dev 
Bid 616 9.35 2.62 308 8.43 3.84 308 7.80 4.86 
Bid ex 20 611 9.25 2.45 288 7.62 2.40 275 6.33 2.52 
Bid Winner 336 7.71 1.63 168 6.17 1.25 168 4.98 1.71 
Inflation Increment 616 2.87 2.16 308 2.07 3.50 308 1.12 4.47 
Inflation ex 20 611 2.80 2.02 288 1.38 2.30 275 -0.19 2.45 
Inflation Winner 336 2.46 1.74 168 0.77 1.93 168 -0.92 2.44 
Pct Inflation 616 0.56 0.55 308 0.42 0.67 308 0.21 0.70 
Pct Inflation ex 20 611 0.55 0.55 288 0.32 0.53 275 0.03 0.38 
Pct Inflation Winner 336 0.58 0.53 168 0.25 0.41 168 -0.06 0.39 
 
 
It is evident from Table 3 that there are significant differences in bidding behavior 
in the winners and ex-20 subgroups.  Winners inflate their bids by a lower than average 
amount in all three treatments (2.46, .77, and -.92 points in the R,H, and L treatments 
respectively).  This may be compared with an average of 2.87, 2.07, and 1.12 points of 
average inflation in all R, H, and L treatments.  Interestingly, the percentage of inflation 
is slightly larger for winners in the R treatment when compared with the average 
percentage of inflation for the full sample (58% for the winners versus 56% for the full 
sample).  This would indicate that a subject’s value is a major determinant of their 
success in selling their unit in the R treatment.  Also, the increasing percentage for 
winners versus the entire sample indicates that low value holders inflate more than higher 
value holders in the R treatment which is consistent with auction theory.  That is not the 
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case in the H and L treatments where the percentages of inflation for the winners are 
substantially lower than those of the average bidder, (.25 vs. .42 in the H and -.06 vs. .21 
in the L).  The same idea that inflation percentages are lower for winners in the H and L 
treatments also holds when comparing the winner and ex-20 subgroups, thereby 
indicating that those subjects who respond to the threat by decreasing their percentage of 
bid inflation are most likely to sell their unit in these treatment periods.   
Table 4 reports mean inflation measures for each group of treatments that are 
calculated in accordance with the previously mentioned formula.  Scores were closer to 1 
in both the H and L threat treatments, thereby indicating that the computer was able to 
purchase each unit at a price closer to the seller’s value in those treatments.  Interestingly, 
the ratio went below 1 for the L treatment as the severity of the threat caused bids to be 
driven below values on average for the lowest 6 bidders.  This could partially stem from 
the higher random value draw in the L treatment periods (6.68 vs. an H treatment mean of 
6.35 and an R treatment mean of 6.48).   Since the low budget in the L treatment was 
designed to contain the expectation of the value distribution (specifically, the expectation 
of the sum of the lowest 6 out of 11 values randomly drawn between ‘3’ and ‘10’ = 
29.10), the greater random value draws in L treatment periods (31.14 on average for the 
sum of the lowest 6 values) was too high for subjects to avoid the threat without lowering 
their bids to a level below their values.   
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Table 4. Mean Inflation Scores 
Mean Score   Treatment 
1.47 R 
1.14* H 
.84** L 
*Threat was realized in 10 out of 28 periods 
**Threat was realized in 13 out of 28 periods 
 
The same pattern is found in the calculation of the mean “total inflation” scores 
reported in Table 5.  Here the scores are slightly higher because we are now comparing 
bids of the lowest six bidders with the values of the lowest six value holders.  The 
different scores in each treatment indicate that not all winning contracts are being 
allocated to the lowest value holders, a phenomenon which will be explored later with 
specific measures of adverse selection in each treatment.   
Table 5. Mean Total Inflation Scores 
Mean Score   Treatment 
1.59 R 
1.31* H 
0.96** L 
*Threat was realized in 10 out of 28 periods 
**Threat was realized in 13 out of 28 periods 
 
 Further sensitivity analyses of the inflation scores are reported below in Table 6 
and Table 7.  In Table 6 it is apparent that the average percentage by which bids exceed 
values is highest for the low value holders.  A similar result is found by comparing Table 
7 with Table 4.  Here we find that the ratio of bids to values for the lowest value holders 
is larger than the ratio for contract winners, again confirming the existence of adverse 
selection in the auctions.    
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Table 6. Sensitivity Analysis – Geometric Means of Bid to Value Ratios 
Treatment           R H L 
∑(b/v) for all observations 1.56 1.42 1.21 
∑(b/v) for observations of the lowest 6 bidders 1.59 1.25 0.94 
∑(b/v) for observations of the lowest 6 value holders 1.72 1.58 1.25 
*Threat was realized in 10 out of 28 periods 
**Threat was realized in 13 out of 28 periods 
 
      
Table 7. Sensitivity Analysis – Ratio of Bids to Values For the Lowest Six Value Holders 
∑(b)/∑(v) for observations of the lowest 6 value holders       Treatment 
1.63 R 
1.50 H 
1.20 L 
*Threat was realized in 10 out of 28 periods 
**Threat was realized in 13 out of 28 periods 
 
Table 8 reports the average of a measurement of adverse selection costs in each 
treatment.  These costs are calculated for each period as the difference between the sum 
of values for the 6 accepted bidders and the sum of the 6 lowest overall values.  Adverse 
selection costs are highest in the H treatment and L treatments.  Two sample t-tests 
confirm that the mean adverse selection costs are significantly higher in the H and L 
auction periods at the α=.01 significance level.  A high adverse selection cost is 
undesirable and inefficient as it corresponds to the case where individuals with a 
relatively high opportunity cost engage in contracts with the conservation agent.  Another 
way to examine adverse selection costs is presented in Table 9.  As the table shows, 
83.93 percent of the contracts in the R auction periods were allocated to the individuals 
with the lowest opportunity cost.  This may be contrasted with only 74.40 percent of the 
contracts in the H and L auction periods.   
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Table 8. Adverse Selection Costs (a) 
Mean Cost Treatment 
2.43 R 
4.07* H 
4.21*   L 
*Threat was realized in 10 out of 28 periods 
**Threat was realized in 13 out of 28 periods 
 
Table 9. Adverse Selection Costs (b) 
Percentage of Contracts Allocated Efficiently Treatment 
83.93   R 
74.40* H 
74.40**   L 
*Threat was realized in 10 out of 28 periods 
**Threat was realized in 13 out of 28 periods 
 
Results of an OLS regression of the inflation increment on subject’s values and a 
dummy variable for each of the H and L auction periods using subject fixed effects are 
presented in Table 10.  The equation estimated is as follows: 
(, − -	
 ) = 	 + ,#-	
 + ,./ℎ + ,12 +   
The r-squared of the regression is .28 and all variables are statistically significant at the 
α=.01 level.  The constant term of 4.33 reflects the average amount of bid inflation that 
one would expect to observe in the R auctions for a subject with a value of zero.  Of 
course the lowest possible value is 3 and the average is 6.48 in all R auction periods.  The 
coefficient on value of -.23 reveals that bid inflation decreases with higher value draws.  
The regression indicates that an individual with an average value draw of 6.48 would be 
expected to inflate their bid by 2.84 points (a substantial 44 percent above underlying 
value) in R-type auctions.  Looking at the coefficient on the H auction dummy, it appears 
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that the presence of the threat in the H treatment serves to reduce the inflation increment, 
as is reflected in the coefficient value of -.82.  This result shows that the ordinary level of 
bid inflation may be reduced by the introduction of a relatively modest threat.  The 
coefficient on the L auction dummy of -1.70 shows an even greater reduction of the 
inflation increment in L treatment auctions.  
Table 10. Inflation Increment Results Using OLS With Subject Fixed Effects 
Value -0.23 
(6.13)* 
High -0.82 
(4.12)* 
Low -1.7 
(8.54)* 
Const 4.33 
  (16.31)* 
R² 0.28 
*Absolute t-ratios are significant at the a=.01 level 
 
Table 11 reports results from an OLS regression of the inflation increment on 
value and period for all R observations as well as those in the ex-20 and winner 
subgroups.  The equation estimated is as follows: 
(, − -	
 ) = 	 + ,#-	
 + ,. +   
The coefficient of 0.00 on period (albeit with no statistical significance) indicates that 
subjects treated each R auction independently.  There is no evidence of learning or 
convergence in the R auctions.  The lower coefficient on value for winners indicates that 
value was a more important factor in lowering the inflation increment among the winners.  
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Table 11. Inflation Increment Results in Regular Treatment Using OLS with Subject 
Fixed Effects 
  R1 R2 
  R1 R2   R1 R2 
  ex 20 ex 20   win win 
Value -0.28 -0.28   -0.31 -0.31   -0.55 -0.55 
(9.00)* (9.00)* (10.62)* (10.61)* (15.49)* (15.46)* 
Period 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.02) (0.23) (0.28) 
const 4.69 4.69 4.80 4.82 5.33 5.31 
  (21.88)* (20.03)*   (24.09)* (22.16)*   (27.47)* (25.68)* 
R² 0.41 0.41   0.43 0.43   0.70 0.70 
*Absolute t-ratios are significant at the a=.01 level 
 
Table 12 reports results from the H auctions of an OLS regression of the inflation 
increment on value, period, and the dummy variable lastinter which equals 1 if there was 
an intervention in the last period and zero otherwise.  The equation estimated is as 
follows: 
(, − -	
 ) = 	 + ,#-	
 + ,.2	3 + ,1 +   
In the ex-20 subgroup and winner subgroups, it is evident that having an intervention in 
one period caused individuals to lower their level of inflation by around half a point in 
the next period.  As was the case of the R auctions, the winners in the H auctions lowered 
their inflation increments with each increase in value more than the average bidder (-.70 
vs. -.45 in the ex-20 subgroup and -.20 for the entire sample).   
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Table 12. Inflation Increment Results in High Budget Treatment Using OLS with Subject 
Fixed Effects 
H1 H2 H3 
H1  H2 H3 H1 H2 H3 
ex20  ex20 ex 20 win win win 
Value -0.21 -0.22 -0.22   -0.44 -0.45 -0.45   -0.68 -0.70 -0.70 
(2.82)* (2.84)* (2.89)* (8.63)* (8.85)* (9.02)* (16.70)* (17.30)* (17.21)* 
Lastinter -0.24 -0.18 -0.59 -0.51 -0.41 -0.40 
(0.72) (0.52) (2.65)* (2.32)** (2.65)* (2.50)** 
Period -0.10 -0.12 -0.02 
(1.24) (2.34)** (0.56) 
const 3.44 3.53 4.60 4.14 4.37 5.69 4.44 4.67 4.87 
  (6.77)* (6.73)* (4.55)*   (12.29)* (12.71)* (8.62)*   (19.36)* (19.44)* (11.01)* 
R² 0.48 0.48 0.49   0.51 0.52 0.53   0.85 0.86 0.86 
*Absolute t-ratios are significant at the (*)a=.01 level and (**)a=.05 level 
(Threat was realized in 10 out of 28 periods) 
 
Results from an OLS regression for the L auctions of the inflation increment on 
value, period, and lastinter are reported in Table 13.  The equation estimated is as 
follows: 
(, − -	
 ) = 	 + ,#-	
 + ,.2	3 + ,1 +   
As in the H auctions, having an intervention in one period reduced the levels of bid 
inflation in the next period.  Not surprisingly, the winners in L auctions lowered their 
inflation increments with each increase in value more than the average bidder in those 
auctions.  In fact, the above regressions for the H and L treatments showed a larger 
coefficient on value than the R treatment regressions reported in Table 11.  This is not too 
surprising given our earlier supposition that individuals will be seeking to maximize the 
following in the H and L treatments: 
max(	
) ∗ ( ) +  ( − 	
) ∗ () 
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It appears as though the left side of the above maximization equation takes priority over 
the right side for the highest value holders in threat treatments.  In order to reduce the 
probability of losing their comparatively large value from an intervention, the higher 
value holders bid a smaller amount above their value or a larger amount below their value 
than lower value holders.    
Table 13. Inflation Increment Results in Low Budget Treatment Using OLS with Subject 
Fixed Effects 
L1 L2 L3 
L1  L2 L3 L1 L2 L3 
ex20  ex20 ex 20 win win win 
Value -0.15 -0.15 -0.13   -0.47 -0.48 -0.50   -0.80 -0.80 -0.85 
(1.64) (1.65)*** (1.44) (8.99)* (9.25)* (9.15)* (11.68)* (12.06)* (12.27)* 
Lastinter -0.56 -0.55 -0.63 -0.62 -0.74 -0.72 
(1.47) (1.48) (2.96)* (2.90)* (3.02)* (2.97)* 
Period 0.05 -0.06 -0.14 
(0.48) (1.03) (2.20)** 
const 2.09 2.33 1.42 2.91 3.21 4.31 3.77 4.09 6.85 
  (3.38)* (3.65)* (0.72)   (8.09)* (8.72)* (3.83)*   (9.05)* (9.79)* (5.18)* 
R² 0.57 0.57 0.57   0.59 0.60 0.61   0.73 0.75 0.76 
*Absolute t-ratios are significant at the (*)a=.01, (**)a=.05, and (***)a=.10 levels 
(Threat was realized in 13 out of 28 periods) 
 
Of critical importance in the results of these experiments is the fact that the threat 
was triggered in 36 percent of H auctions and 46 percent of L auctions.  This corresponds 
to an outcome of a PES auction in which heterogeneity across opportunity costs is 
ignored and landowners bear the full burden of service provision.  Both equity and 
efficiency arguments may be made against such a case.  Indeed, the implementation of 
the threat presented here would essentially be considered a “taking” under Epstein’s 
interpretation of the eminent domain clause, although prevailing legal opinion is more in 
favor of non-compensable regulation when the outcome is sufficiently justified.  One of 
the main factors contributing to the frequent occurrence of interventions is the high 
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random value draw in several periods.  Indeed, in the cases where the value draw is less 
than the expectation of the distribution (as previously mentioned, 29.1 for the lowest 6 of 
11 randomly drawn values from ‘3’ to ‘10’), the incidence of intervention falls to 17 
percent (2 out of 12) of H auctions and 25 percent (3 out of 12) of L auctions.  This may 
be contrasted with the frequency of interventions when the value draw is greater than 
29.1.  With the higher value draws, the frequency increases to 50 percent (8 out of 16) of 
the H auctions and 63 percent (10 out of 16) of the L auctions.  A summary of these 
observations is presented in Table 14.  This result emphasizes the importance of 
accurately estimating the distribution of opportunity costs across service providers in 
these forms of auctions.  If actual costs are higher than the estimated distribution, then 
there will be a considerably higher incidence of threat realizations relative to the case 
where costs are not underestimated.   
Table 14. Percentage of Interventions in Threat Treatments 
H  
 
L 
All Values 35.71% 10 of 28   46.43% 13 of 28 
Values ≤ 29 16.67% 2 of 12 
 
25.00% 3 of 12 
Values > 29 50.00% 8 of 16   62.50% 10 of 16 
29.1 = Expectation of the sum of the lowest 6 of 11 values drawn randomly from 3 to 10 
 
Next, we construct a benefit-cost analysis of bid inflation versus allocative 
inefficiency from the implementation of a regulatory threat in the auctions.  In Table 15 
we compare across treatments the nominal outcomes in these auctions (adjusted by a 
realistic excess burden, or distortionary cost, for raising the required revenue) with the 
best case outcome from a social perspective.  The difference between these two scenarios 
may be thought of as the net benefit accruing to the auction from implementing the threat 
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treatments.  Again, the nominal outlays must be adjusted because the social cost arising 
from bid inflation is not simply the amount by which payments exceed underlying values, 
but instead it is that difference adjusted by an appropriate average cost of funds.  The 
average cost of funds chosen was 30 percent, following Feldstein’s analysis of the United 
States’ income tax (Feldstein 1999).9  The calculation of the net benefit measure is as 
follows: 
* 43 = 56	
 433 − ,3 76	
 433 
56	
 433 = (. 30 ∗ 6 ∗ %	  ℎ 
3 3; 3)
+ (6 ∗ %	  ℎ 	
3 ℎ
 < ℎ 
3 3; 3) 
,3 76	
 433 =
 (. 30 ∗ 6 ∗ %	  ℎ 
3 3; 	
3) + (6 ∗ %	  ℎ 
3 3; 	
3 )   
The net cost measure represents the inefficiency of the deadweight loss from extra tax 
dollars from bid inflation plus the excess costs from misallocations.  From Table 15, it is 
apparent that net costs of the auctions are lower on average in the H and L treatments.  
Table 16 then compares the average percentage improvement in net cost from 
implementing each of the threat treatments.  Net costs are improved by 12 percent and 49 
percent on average from the implementation of the H and L treatments, respectively.  
However, this measure ignores the fact that the threat was actually triggered in several 
cases, and enthusiasm over the improvements in net costs must be tempered by this 
knowledge. 
                                                 
9 Estimates of the marginal cost of the last unit of revenue raised range as high as 200 percent, considerably 
greater than the estimate of 30 percent for the average distortionary cost used here. 
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Table 15. Social Costs of the Auctions 
Net Cost of the Auction     Treatment 
7.58 R 
6.69 H 
3.83 L 
 
 
Table 16. Benefit from Threat Implementation 
Percent Reduction in Net Cost From Threat Implementation   Treatment 
11.75% H 
49.47% L 
 
Finally, we look to the performance of auction theory with respect to the R 
auction results.  The mean bid in R auctions was 9.35 versus a mean predicted bid for 
risk-neutral bidders of 8.77, conditioned on the value draws.  Although these means are 
fairly close, a Wilcoxon signed- rank test indicates that the distributions of actual bids 
versus risk-neutral predictions are significantly different with a p-value of 0.001.  Paired t 
tests conditioned on each value show that bids were significantly lower than the risk 
neutral prediction when values were between 3 and 5, while they were significantly 
higher when values were between 8 and 10.  Lower than predicted bids could be 
explained by the presence of risk aversion among low value holders.  However, risk 
aversion does not explain why the majority of bids among high value holders (8-10) are 
above the risk-neutral prediction.  Figure 8 shows a plot of actual bids versus the risk-
neutral prediction.  Bids have been slightly dispersed with spherical noise so that they do 
not overlap, however each point in a cluster corresponds to the nearest integer value on 
the y axis.  In the picture there are many more observations below (above) the prediction 
when the corresponding value draw is low (high).  
  
Figure 8. Actual Bid Versus Prediction in Regular Treatment Auctions
 
Overall, the results from the experiment highlight important tradeoffs that arise 
from the issuance of a regulatory threat.  On the one hand, the presence of a regulatory 
threat reduces the level of bid inflation in procurement auctions.  On the other hand
realization of the threat in 36 percent of the H auctions and 46 percent of the L auctions is 
undesirable, as it represents the case in which an undue portion of the costs of service 
provision are forced onto landowners.  However, the incidence of th
considerably lower for auction periods in which the actual value draws are equal to or 
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less than the expectation of the value distribution. This result underscores the importance 
of correctly estimating the distribution of opportunity costs in this regulatory scheme.  
Another problematic effect of issuing a regulatory threat is the increase in adverse 
selection among contract allocations.  In this experiment, the adverse selection costs in 
the auctions increased about 70 percent for both the H and L treatments.   
In terms of equity and efficiency, it becomes apparent that both may be adversely 
affected by the implementation of the regulatory threat in this experiment.  To balance 
those negatives is the positive effect of reduced bid inflation among auction participants.  
This experiment represents a boundary case in which the regulation is applied to all 
stakeholders.  Other permutations of the regulation that fall between forcing each 
participant to provide the service and doing nothing may have different impacts on the 
incidence of threat realization, adverse selection costs, and overall provision costs.  Those 
experiments have yet to be run.  Here, the form of regulation punishes service providers 
for inflating their bids above their costs while ensuring that the environmental service is 
provided, regardless of the bidding behavior of participants.  This structure may be of use 
in circumstances characterized by a tight public budget, ambiguous property rights, and a 
keen need for the environmental service.  Evaluating these criteria is beyond the scope of 
this chapter, but the results obtained here highlight the tradeoffs that one would expect to 
observe from the implementation of such a scheme.  
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Chapter 2: Estimating Bid Inflation in Procurement of Environmental Services 
 
Introduction 
Auction mechanisms are gaining popularity as tools for the procurement of 
environmental services from private landowners.  This trend is occurring because the 
competitive processes used to allocate contracts in auctions reduce the incentives for 
landowners to inflate their opportunity costs of service provision relative to the incentives 
they face when traditional fixed payment allocation mechanisms are implemented.  In 
spite of these improvements, theoretical, empirical, and laboratory evidence all suggest 
that landowners bid significantly higher than their opportunity costs when participating in 
auctions for environmental services (Cason and Gangadharan 2005; Cox, Smith, and 
Walker 1984; Kirwan, Lubowski, and Roberts 2005; Laury 2002).  For example, when 
looking at U.S. Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) auctions, Kirwan et al. estimate 
that payments to landowners are at levels from 11 to 67 percent above opportunity costs 
in 2002-2003, the most recent periods of their sample.  These estimates represent profits 
above opportunity costs to program participants of a substantial amount, considering the 
program has disbursed more than $30 billion dollars since inception in 1985.  From an 
efficiency perspective, these windfall gains create a need for the allocation of a greater 
amount of public funds to purchase a given level of environmental services than would be 
necessary if participants bid their true opportunity costs of providing services. 
The size of windfall gains to participants in conservation auctions will likely 
depend on numerous factors including auction rules, frequency of auctions, types of 
conservation practices contracted, and the duration of contracts.  Furthermore, estimating 
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gains is difficult when the auction is not incentive compatible, and thus, reservation 
prices are unobserved.  Such is the case with one of the most commonly used auction 
mechanisms, the discriminatory price auction.  Empirical studies of the CRP have been 
informative, but they only examine one specific auction design, albeit the one used in the 
world’s largest conservation auction.  Other smaller auctions with differing designs have 
been used to contract conservation services in the U.S., Australia, Germany, and England.  
More research is needed to obtain greater understanding of the performance 
characteristics of different conservation auctions.  Specifically, it will be necessary to 
explore auctions for different kinds of services, as well as those which employ different 
rules.  Whether or not the magnitude of windfall gains to auction participants varies 
greatly with respect to the type of service being contracted or to the specific choice of 
auction rules (even among auctions that use some form of discriminatory pricing) 
remains an open question.  This analysis helps answer the question by estimating gains to 
participants in auctions for irrigation suspension in Georgia (U.S.).  Predictions informed 
by economic literature and theory are used to elicit bidder’s implied values distributions, 
and these distributions are compared across multiple iterations of the auction.  Because 
the data were collected during the implementation of two separate discriminatory pricing 
rules in 2001 and 2002, it is possible to compare the performance of auctions for the 
same service under those different rules.  Multiple iterations of auction rounds allow for 
an analysis of how participants adapt their bidding behavior in the face of new 
information.  In addition, we use the underlying value distribution to compare auction 
performance with hypothetical fixed payment schemes of permit procurement.  
The findings of this chapter show the existence of substantial and varying levels 
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of bid inflation in discriminatory price auction institutions.  Over repeated rounds, rent-
seeking participants reduce their bids toward the maximum accepted price on average.  
The implementation of a maximum reserve price also improves auction performance.  
Finally, a greater number of permits were procured under both auction mechanisms than 
would have been possible within the same budget using a fixed payment protocol. 
The next section of the chapter contains a concise review of the relevant 
economic literature.   
Literature Review 
An auction is defined as a market institution with an explicit set of rules 
determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from market participants 
(McAfee and McMillan 1987).  Clearly auctions have properties that are helpful for the 
provision of environmental services.  Participants are able to deal with uncertainty about 
the value of services by allowing the auction institution to determine whether or not a 
contract is accepted.  
In their theoretical analysis of PES auctions, Latacz-Lohmann and Hamsvoort 
(herein referred to as “LH”) develop a model of conservation auctions in which each 
landowner compares potential profits after implementing the conservation practice plus 
the nonstochastic conservation payment with the profit from remaining at the status quo 
(not winning a contract) (Latacz-Lohmann and Hamsvoort 1997).  In their model, 
landowners weigh the probability of having their bid accepted against the increased gains 
that would result from a larger conservation payment.  Operationalizing the theory in LH 
requires an assumption of the distribution of participant’s expectations of what will be the 
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highest accepted bid in the auction, an external assumption to the model.  While this is a 
departure from traditional auction theory where the optimal bid is determined 
endogenously by the number of auction participants and contracts accepted, along with 
the assumption of the expectation of the highest value held among all of the auction 
participants (which is external to the model when the maximum reserve price is 
unannounced), LH assert that it is appropriate to incorporate the formulation of the 
distribution of participant’s expectations since conservation auctions often have external 
factors associated with them that would enter into the optimal bid function such as the 
amount of money appropriated to the auction program, or a projected contract target.  
After applying their model to a hypothetical conservation program, LH conclude that the 
auction mechanism does improve the efficiency of contracting for environmental services 
over traditional fixed-payment schemes used by conservation agents.  However, they 
acknowledge the fact that it is difficult for their theory to “provide a cut and dried 
solution in most real-world setting” because of relaxed assumptions and simplifications.  
In this chapter, we test the actual performance of the Georgia irrigation auctions against 
various hypothetical fixed payment schemes. 
Prior theoretical work also addresses the inclusion of a reserve price in multiunit 
auctions.  A reserve price is a minimum acceptable bid in a buyers’ auction where there 
are multiple buyers and a single seller.  In a sellers’ auction with multiple sellers and a 
single buyer, a reserve price is a maximum acceptable bid.  McAfee and McMillan assert 
that optimal auction design should utilize a maximum reserve price when there are 
multiple units contracted and no firm budget constraint (McAfee and McMillan 1987).  
McMillan later cautions that the maximum reserve price will only be effective when 
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bidding competition is relatively strong (McMillan 1994).  LH report results from the 
application of their model which suggest that the maximum reserve price in 
discriminatory price conservation auctions should be calibrated to a level 30 percent 
higher than the average opportunity cost of service provision to realize the full efficiency 
potential of the auction.  Here, we find the maximum reserve price in the final period data 
to be less than 30 percent above our estimate of the average opportunity cost of service 
provision.   
In spite of the deficiency of theory in providing unassailable solutions to real-
world conservation auctions, particularly those studied in this dissertation, there is a 
general foundation on which to stand that began with Vickrey’s formulations of Nash 
equilibrium bidding behavior in both single unit and multiple unit auctions for risk 
neutral economic agents (Vickrey 1961; Vickrey 1962).  Harris and Raviv (HR) extended 
Vickrey’s model to explain behavior in multiple unit auctions where all bidders have the 
same individual concave utility function and values are drawn from a general distribution 
function (Harris and Raviv 1981).  The equilibrium bid function from HR for risk neutral 
agents was later converted into the form of computable finite polynomials by Cox, Smith, 
and Walker (Cox, Smith, and Walker 1984).  As detailed in the upcoming section on data 
and methods, their formulation of the risk-neutral equilibrium bid function in a standard 
buyers’ auction can be adapted to provide a prediction of behavior in procurement 
auctions.   
In the previously mentioned paper by Kirwan et al., windfall gains are measured 
by estimating the endogenous relationship between windfall gains and the overall CRP 
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bid score.10   This is accomplished by using exogenous components of the overall score 
as instruments for the total score.  Other researchers have also found evidence of 
information rents accruing to landowners in the CRP.  Shoemaker’s analysis depicts how 
these rents may be capitalized into land values for lands which are eligible for the CRP 
(Shoemaker 1989).  Additionally, the Economist’s (Economist 1999)  report on the 
California Headwater Forest purchase and Osterberg’s analysis (Osterberg 1999) of a 
German agri-environment payment program both contain further support for 
informational rents going to landowners in procurement programs.   
One empirical paper which is closely related to the analysis presented here is 
Laury’s 2002 study of the performance of the two different auction institutions used in 
Georgia’s irrigation auctions.  Her report discusses factors which led to the change of 
institutions, the results of laboratory experiments to explore various auction rules, and the 
eventual outcome of the 2002 auction (Laury 2002).  Laury finds offers to be 
substantially lower under the maximum reserve price institution in 2002.  While Laury 
provides a great deal of information with regard to the development and implementation 
of the Georgia irrigation auctions, as well as an informative comparison of auction 
outcomes across institutions, she does not attempt to quantify the windfall gains to 
auction participants.  In order to measure bid inflation, one must uncover the underlying 
value distribution, which is the approach taken in this chapter.       
Cason and Gangadharan find evidence of bid inflation and thus windfall gains 
                                                 
10 Overall bid scores in the CRP are comprised of many factors in addition to a specified payment.  These 
factors include the specific conservation services proposed, environmental benefits accruing from many 
factors, whether or not the location of a parcel is in a state or national conservation priority area, and others.  
Note how this contrasts with the GA irrigation auctions where all eligible acreage is assumed to provide the 
same per acre benefit and bids are only differentiated by the proposed payment per acre of irrigation 
reduction. 
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accruing to auction participants in laboratory experiments using both uniform and 
discriminative price auctions (Cason and Gangadharan 2005).  In their experiments, the 
sealed bid discriminatory price auction institution allows the buyer to purchase a larger 
quantity of services than the sealed bid uniform price auction.  They find evidence of at 
least 8 percent bid inflation in most offers.  By comparison, the experiments reported in 
Chapter 1 (Holmes 2009) find evidence of inflation to be over 40 percent on average in 
different parameterizations of discriminatory price reverse auctions. 
Cummings, Holt, and Laury also examined the implications of different auction 
institutions in a paper which describes the design process of the 2001 Georgia irrigation 
auction (Cummings, Holt, and Laury 2004).  After experimenting in both the laboratory 
and the field, CHL arrived at the recommendation that the regulatory authority use a first 
price sealed bid discriminatory price auction with multiple rounds of bid revisions to 
secure a certain level of irrigation suspension in the Flint River Basin.  They found that 
the auction mechanism used in 2001 induced farmers to decrease offers over time and 
was considered a success even though certain aspects of the auction design (namely the 
enforcement of constraints by state officials, i.e., fixed budget, acreage target, average 
price, and maximum accepted price constraints) differed between experimental design 
and real-world implementation.  Similarly to Laury (2002), the CHL paper did not 
address the magnitude of windfall gains to auction participants.  
Previous studies of repeated auctions have shown that repetition degrades the 
efficiency properties of conservation auctions.  In looking at the early signup periods of 
the U.S. CRP, Reichelderfer and Boggess find that the average bid converges to the 
maximum accepted payment in the previous round over time (Reichelderfer 1988).  Later 
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work by Hailu and Schilizzi simulates repeated auctions using an agent based model with 
learning.  They also find that repeating the auction process over time degrades efficiency 
(Hailu and Schilizzi 2004).  In this chapter, we analyze five consecutive auction periods 
to empirically examine any effects of repetition on auction efficiency.  
Finally, there are several cases in the literature where researchers have used 
observables gathered from field data from auctions to estimate the underlying parameters 
in those auctions.  Athey and Haile provide a discussion of approaches to structural 
estimation of auctions, focusing on first price sealed bid and ascending auctions (Athey 
and Haile 2007).  Wolak presents empirical techniques for recovering cost function 
estimates for the early months of operation of the National Electricity Market in Australia 
(Wolak 2003).  Zulehner has an empirical study of bidding behavior in sequential cattle 
auctions in Austria (Zulehner 2003).  Other researchers have conducted empirical studies 
of auctions for different commodities such as the U.S. government’s sale of 
electromagnetic spectrum for personal communication services, oil and gas leases, and 
timberland harvesting contracts (Haile 2001; Hendricks, Porter, and C.Wilson 1994; 
McAfee and McMillan 1996).  
This concludes the literature review.  The next section of the chapter presents a 
detailed description of the data and methodology employed. 
Data and Methodology 
The data used in this analysis come from the previously mentioned auctions for 
irrigation services that were conducted in the Flint River Basin of Georgia in 2001 and 
2002.  These auctions were a result of legislation passed in Georgia in 2000, which 
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directed the state’s Environmental Protection Division (EPD) to conduct auction-like 
processes to purchase irrigation rights from landowners in drought years.  The goal of the 
legislation, termed the Flint River Drought Protection Act,11 was to ensure a sufficient 
water flow in the Flint River to maintain healthy ecosystems and populations of aquatic 
life during drought years.   
Reverse discriminatory price auction institutions were used in 2001 and 2002 to 
purchase contracts for irrigation suspension from landowners.  Each one year contract 
covered all of the acreage attached to a specific irrigation permit.  The locations of 
acreage eligible for participation in the auctions were largely similar in both years, with 
the following exceptions.  Specifically, 84 out of the 576 total permits were eligible in 
2001 but not in 2002.  Similarly, 203 out of 695 total permits were eligible in 2002 but 
not in 2001.  At the intersection, 492 “common” permits were eligible in both auction 
years.  There was some modification to the eligible acreage in 330 of the 492 common 
permits across years, but the total acreage eligible was virtually unchanged at 85,755 
acres in 2001 and 86,001 acres in 2002.  Of the common permits, 212 were offered in 
2001 and 255 were offered in 2002.  The size of permits bid in both auctions ranged from 
1 to 1442 acres with a mean parcel size of 180 acres in 2001 and 167 acres in 2002.  
Standard deviations from the mean acreages for all common parcels bid was 187 acres in 
2001 and 165 acres in 2002. 
While both the 2001 and 2002 auctions employed a form of the reverse 
discriminatory price auction institution, each year’s institution had specific aspects which 
made them substantially different from one another.  In 2001, a sealed bid auction in 
                                                 
11 O.C.G.A. 12-4-540 through 12-5-550 
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which provisional winners and losers were privately notified whether or not their bid 
would have been accepted in each auction round was used.  The maximum average price 
paid per acre was designated by the EPD director (but not disclosed to bidders) in each 
round, and these prices rose during the auction process from $104.88/acre in round 1 to 
$135.85/acre in round 5.  The round at which to end the auction was also decided by the 
EPD director during the 2001 auction process.  It is important to note that a priori, 
bidders did not know the total number of rounds or if there would be more than one 
round.  In contrast, the 2002 auction implemented a stated maximum reserve price per 
acre of $150 for a single round sealed bid discriminatory price reverse auction.  The 2001 
process generated five rounds of bidding from 333 bidders for 60,193 acres of land to be 
removed from irrigation.  33,101 acres were contracted in the fifth and final round at a 
mean price of $135.85 per acre.  In contrast, the 2002 auction allowed for the removal of 
40,386 acres from irrigation at mean price of $127.92 per acre (all bids of $145/acre or 
less were accepted).  These results are summarized in Table 17. 
Table 17. Summary of 2001 and 2002 Georgia Irrigation Auctions 
 
  Number of    Total   % of   Total       Mean 
  
Eligible 
 
Eligible  
 
Contracts 
 
Acres 
 
Acres 
 
Price 
Year   Contracts   Acres   Offered   Offered   Contracted   Per Acre 
2001 
 
576 
 
98,170 
 
58 
 
60,193 
 
33,101 
 
135.85 
2002 
 
695 
 
111,336 
 
49 
 
52,723 
 
40,386 
 
127.92 
 
Ceteris paribus, it appears that modifying the institution to a single round auction 
with an announced maximum reserve price in 2002 did result in a lower expenditure per 
acre of land taken out of irrigation in that year relative to the cost in 2001.  That finding 
would reinforce earlier work from McAfee and McMillan which suggests that the 
inclusion of an appropriate maximum reserve price will improve auction efficiency.  
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However, several factors which could affect this outcome did indeed vary across years.  
Examples of these factors are the inclusion and exclusion of different eligible parcels, 
varying levels of surface water, changing parcel sizes covered under a permit, changing 
crop prices, and the varying decisions on choice of crop by landowners.  Fortunately, the 
richness of our dataset allows us to match common parcels across years and account for 
changing planting decisions.12  Moreover, each of the above factors is held constant 
across the five rounds of the 2001 auction.  Because of this consistency in 2001, an 
analysis of changes in the underlying value distributions as implied by participant’s 
bidding behavior in each of the five rounds will provide robust evidence of bid inflation, 
so long as the assumption of rationality among landowners holds.  This assumption 
implies that landowners never make bids below their opportunity costs.13 
A logical first step in the analysis of bid inflation, both within the repeated rounds 
of 2001 and across the outcomes of both years, is to look toward economic theory for a 
benchmark approximation of the underlying value distributions implied from actual 
bidding behavior in those auctions.  If there is no inflation, then stability in the implied 
value distributions should be observed across auction periods.  Auction theory of 
multiunit discriminatory price auctions provides a way to accomplish this approximation 
with the following three assumptions.  First, we assume an independent, private-values 
information environment.  In this environment, no individual knows with certainty the 
                                                 
12 Changing numbers of competing bidders, total eligible acreage, and total acres bid in different auction 
years would also influence bidding behavior.  These concerns will be addressed in the theoretical 
discussion that follows.  
13 An alternative idea might be that landowners concerned about the potential damages from reduced 
stream flows could rationally make offers that are below values.  But, this is unlikely given that plenty of 
money was available to achieve the goal of protecting the river basin ($10 million set aside from a large 
tobacco settlement in 2001, of which only $4,478,842 was spent).  Furthermore, there were a large number 
of auction participants, each of whom had only a limited ability to influence the final outcome of the 
auction. 
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values possessed by other auction participants, and if they did have this knowledge, it 
would not affect their own private value (Krishna 2002).  Although some common value 
components exist in the auctions, such as expectations of the weather, future crop prices, 
etc., private values is a more appropriate choice because the value of irrigating is realized 
through increased production of crops for which each farmer in the river basin is a price 
taker competing in a large regional and possibly national or global market.  Moreover, 
each farmer likely has greater knowledge of their own production function than anyone 
else.  Alternatively, it can be argued that farmers’ values are better characterized by the 
affiliated private values information structure.  In this structure, each farmer knows only 
their own value of the water in irrigation, but, if they have a high (low) value for the 
water, then it would be more likely that other farmers have a high (low) value.  While this 
information structure is appealing, differences in the cost of pumping water, dryfarming 
techniques, management skill of the farmer, the amount of capital employed per acre, and 
the choice of crops planted are not necessarily affiliated.  However, prices received for 
the crops at market and weather expectations are likely to result in some affiliated 
components of value.  Laboratory experiments by Kagel, Harstad, and Levin (KHL) find 
that affiliated values auctions for a single unit indicate may yield a higher selling price 
(less bid shading) in first price auctions if public information is announced beforehand 
(Kagel, Harstad, and Levin 1987).  In the auctions studied here, public information was 
not announced, but landowners were able to talk amongst themselves before and during 
the auctions.  The results from KHL imply that our assumption of independent instead of 
affiliated private values may result in larger estimates of bid inflation, although KHL 
examine single unit instead of multiple unit auctions.  Another assumption made in the 
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application of theory is that bidders are risk neutral holders of equal sized units.14  The 
average unit size in our data was 180 (160) with a standard deviation of 186 (167) acres 
in the 2001 (2002) auctions.  Some units were differentiated by the fact that they had 
multi-year crops growing, such as peach trees (USDA 2007),15 that would not be planted 
in the upcoming April.  However, 75 percent of survey respondents indicated that they 
planted corn, peanuts, or cotton in 2001 – this percentage fell to 70 percent among the 
same farmers in 2002 (Laury 2002).  Although there are differences in the size and 
quality of units held in each auction, this departure from the theoretical assumption is 
mitigated by the large number of permits contracted in each period : ranging from 50 to 
272; and the total number of acres that were contracted in both years: 33,101 (40,386) in 
2001 (2002).  It seems unlikely that a relatively low number of permits covering acreage 
of either a large size or with an unusual choice of crop would exert much influence on 
bids of other participants, especially given the private information sealed bid design 
employed in the auctions. Lastly, we join this analysis to existing economic theory by 
making the assumption that farmers formulate their bids as if they know the total number 
of irrigation permits that will be purchased in each auction period before the auction takes 
place.   
With the three assumptions mentioned above, traditional auction theory allows us 
to approximate underlying value distributions in each auction period.  The values 
                                                 
14 If instead, we assumed risk aversion among bidders, then the implied value distributions in each period 
would be shifted upward by similar magnitudes. Given that we find large differences in implied value 
distributions across periods under risk neutrality, it is unlikely that a small upward shift in value estimates 
for each period would substantially change the results.  
15 While the value per acre of a crop of peach trees would likely be worth considerably more than that of 
more commonly planted crops, there are only a few peach farms in the eligible permit area.  Specifically, of 
the seven counties with the most eligible land in 2002 (over 80%), there are peach farms on less than 3% of 
the parcels. 
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recovered depend on the amounts bid ( ) by individual permit holders  = 1, … , * in 
the auctions, the total number of bidders (*), the total number of permits purchased (=), 
and the highest value auction participants believe to be held by all permit holders (+).  Of 
course, theory predicts that sellers will try to earn a profit in the auction by increasing 
their bids above their values and this prediction has been shown to be true in both 
experiments and empirical studies mentioned earlier.  The amount by which a bid 
exceeds underlying value, otherwise referred to as the quantity of bid inflation, increases 
with increasing = or decreasing *.  According to the theory, bid inflation is also higher 
when + is higher.  Since + is the only parameter that must be chosen in our estimation of 
2001 value distributions (in 2002 + is equal to the specified maximum reserve price of 
$150 per acre), careful consideration must be taken in its selection.   
Again, + is the value which individuals bidding in the auction believe to be the 
highest value held by other bidders.  Although this value is unknown in 2001, there are 
different ways to determine a plausible choice for +.  One way is to examine the 
percentage of eligible contracts that were offered between 2001 when + is unknown and 
2002 when + is known to be $150 per acre (because of the maximum acceptable reserve 
price).  In 2001, 58 percent (333 out of 576) of eligible contracts were offered in the 
auction.  This compares to 49 percent (343 out of 695) of eligible contracts that were 
offered in the 2002 auction.  Because a larger portion of eligible contracts were offered in 
the 2001 relative to 2002, it is likely that in 2001, + was greater than its value of $150 per 
acre in 2002.  Another way to determine + is to think of it as the difference in returns for 
the highest possible yield from irrigated farming versus the lowest possible yield from 
dryfarming.  This is reasonable to do since the majority of farmers chose to plant crops 
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after they sold their irrigation permits (87 and 90 percent in 2001 and 2002, respectively).  
Fortunately, researchers (Faircloth and Rowland 2006; Faircloth et al. 2005) have already 
examined the returns to irrigation in the Flint River Basin.  They estimated differences 
between dryland and irrigated returns on peanuts using controlled experiments in 
Dawson, GA occurring from 2002 through 2005.  In their analysis, dryland returns are 
actually higher than irrigated in two out of three years.  However, there is one year in 
which they observe a difference in profit of $228.66 per acre between optimally irrigated 
and dryland acreages.  Calculations using data for corn and cotton yield similar estimates 
of maximum profit differentials.  Therefore it seems reasonable as a first approximation 
to use $229 and $150 for + in years 2001 and 2002 respectively.  Interestingly, this 
estimate is below the highest bids observed in the 2001 auctions.  The theoretical 
prediction of bid inflation does not account for this discrepancy, as theory indicates that 
the bid should equal to underlying value when value  = +.  It is possible that a small 
number of peach farmers (whose values per acre of peaches far outstrip those of other 
farmers) could have participated in the auction and bid above the estimated +, but the 
number of these farmers is limited (less than 3 percent of total eligible units in the seven 
most aggressively targeted counties of the river basin - Macon, Webster, Sumpter, 
Taylor, Randolph, Lee, and Calhoun counties -which accounted for over 80 percent of the 
total eligible permits) (USDA 2007).  Another possible explanation for the impetus 
behind bids exceeding + could arise from the possibility that some landowners feel a 
repugnance or reluctance to sell their existing right to irrigation.  This would explain very 
low ($.01 per acre) and very high (up to $8000 per acre) bids as being protests to the 
institution.  Cummings, Holt, and Laury explain how an individual in 2001 who bid $.01 
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per acre never cashed his check, instead opting to frame it and appear photographed in 
multiple news stories, while criticizing the auction (Cummings, Holt, and Laury 2004).   
In this analysis, we will treat all observations of bids above + as if they are equal to value 
.  More formally,  =      > +.  A rigorous analysis will be made of observations 
that are within the hypothesized range of the value distribution 0, … , + in 2001 and 
those that fall outside of the range ( > + ).  Additionally, we theorize that bids greater 
than + may form a repugnance index for the general auction process and implementation.  
It is important to clarify the consistency across auction years with which (+) is 
interpreted.  In each year, (+) is the maximum value of irrigation across permit holders 
who choose to participate in the auction.  In 2001, (+) is chosen as $230/acre based on 
observations of crop prices, historic improvements in crop yields from irrigation, and 
results from controlled experiments on returns to irrigation in the Flint River Basin.  Bids 
above (+) = $230/acre in 2001 are believed to be protests of the auction institution.  
Protest bids are not feasible in 2002 where only bids of $150/acre or less are accepted.  In 
2002, the maximum value of irrigation across all bidders in the auction, (+), is chosen as 
$150/acre.  Although the highest value of irrigation across eligible participants is still 
believed to be $230/acre, the reserve price precludes any profit-seeking permit holder 
with a value above $150/acre from participating. 
Once + is selected, the theoretical prediction for a risk neutral bidder in Cox 
Smith and Walker (1984) may be inverted to recover the underlying value distribution for 
participants in the 2001 auctions.  The relevant formula for a traditional multiple unit 
discriminatory price auction is as follows. 
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In this formulation, each bidder  = 1, … , * submits a bid  to purchase a single unit, 
and the = highest bidders win (note how this is the reverse of the Georgia irrigation 
auctions, where each bidder submits a bid to sell a single unit, and the = lowest bidders 
win).  The parameter  is the bidder’s underlying value, while + reflects the bidder’s 
belief of the highest underlying value held among all auction participants.  In the above 
formula, participants construct their bids by evaluating the probability that at least 
(* − =) other bids will be lower than their own bids.16  The reverse is true in 
procurement auctions where participants construct their bids by evaluating the probability 
that at least (* − =) of the other bids will be higher than their own bids.  The 
relationship between predicted bidding in a traditional buyer’s auction to the behavior in 
the reverse auctions studied here may be characterized in the following way.  In a 
traditional buyer’s auction, buyers at the lower end of the value distribution are predicted 
to shave their bids by the same amount that sellers at the higher end of the value 
distribution are predicted to inflate their bid in the reverse auctions studied here.  An 
example of this relationship is illustrated in Figure 9.  Double arrows are drawn to 
indicate how the differences between bids and values are related for traditional and 
reverse auction predictions.   
                                                 
16 See Cox, Smith, and Walker, 1984 for a complete exposition of the proof.  
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Figure 9. Predicted Bid Versus Value 
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Results 
Predicted values are tabulated with respect to those which are above and below 
+ in each of the five 2001 auction periods.  These counts are reported in Table 18.  The 
number of bidders whose bids are above the range of + drops from 175 out of 333 in 
period 1 to 119 out of 333 in period 5.  As mentioned earlier, we believe those bids which 
are over + may be indicators of participant’s objections to the auction procedure.  
Another plausible explanation could be that our chosen + is too low, in spite of our best 
efforts to accurately approximate the parameter.  Or perhaps there are strategic forces 
related to the possibility of repeating the auction in future years.  Regardless, the number 
of participants who bid above + fell in each successive period.   
Table 18. Proportion of Plausible Bids in Each Round 
Period   Number of Contracts with Implied Values 
    <230 ≥230 
1 158 175 
2 191 142 
3 205 128 
4 209 124 
5 214 119 
 
The implied value distributions across auction periods are compared to confirm 
the existence of bid inflation.  For each period, the approximate value distribution is 
calculated as if individuals have a priori knowledge of how many contracts will be 
accepted.  If there is no inflation, then the implied value distributions should be stable 
across all auction periods.  Figure 10 shows how the densities of the implied value 
distributions change in each successive auction period for bids that were less than or 
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equal to + in period 1.  It appears as though the distributions are different from one 
another until around period 4 where the overlay between 4 and 5 is fairly close.   
 
 
Figure 10. Implied Value Distributions Across Periods 
 
Table 19 reports two-sided Kolmogrov-Smirnov tests for differences in the 
implied value distributions across periods.  The distributions are significantly different at 
the α=.01 level when comparing periods 1 vs 2, 2 vs 3, and 3 vs 4.  Thus, the hypothesis 
of stability in the implied values across auction rounds is rejected and there is evidence of 
bid inflation.  However, the KS test does not reject the hypothesis that the distributions 
are the same in periods 4 and 5 at the α=.01 level.  These tests reinforce our casual 
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observation from Figure 10 that the implied value distributions are stabilizing at the end 
of the 2001 auction.   
Table 19. Kolmogrov-Smirnov Tests for Equality of Distributions 
 
  Period 1 vs Period 5 
  D P-Value Corrected 
Combined K-S 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  Period 1 vs Period 2 
  D P-Value Corrected 
Combined K-S 0.177 0.000 0.000 
 
  Period 2 vs Period 3 
  D P-Value Corrected 
Combined K-S 0.204 0.000 0.000 
 
  Period 3 vs Period 4 
  D P-Value Corrected 
Combined K-S 0.147 0.001 0.001 
 
  Period 4 vs Period 5 
  D P-Value Corrected 
Combined K-S 0.111 0.033 0.026 
 
A stark contrast in implied values is revealed by comparing the period 1 and 
period 5 densities in Figure 11.  From the graph, it is evident that the peak of the density 
corresponds to an implied value of around $120 per acre of irrigation suspension in the 
fifth period.  That can be contrasted with the density from period 1, where the peak is 
concentrated around an implied value of about $200/acre.   
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Figure 11. Implied Value Distributions in Period 1 Versus Period 5 
 
While the above findings confirm the existence of bid inflation, there is a question 
about why the relationship between bids and values changes in periods 1 through 4.  The 
answer is found by looking at the repeated nature of the auction.  In experimental 
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Vernon Smith’s early paper on auction experiments describes how different conditions 
such as repetition and varying information environments enable auctions to converge to 
equilibrium over time (Smith 1962).  In our field data, we find convergence from above 
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minimum predicted values revealed by bids, of which the majority occurred in period 5 
(51%).    
We measure the mean bid inflation in each of the  = 1, … ,5 periods of the 
2001 auction with the following formula:  
%	  
	@ = A1*B C @ − %%% D 
E
 "#  
which shows the mean difference between individual’s bids and their minimum implied 
values (D) across each of the five periods.  More formally, F%%% D =
 %@"#,…,G  H#( @)I.  Table 20 reports the mean bid inflation in each period for 
three groups of observations.  Group 1 is comprised of observations for those individuals 
who bid less than 230 in every period.  Group 2 is made up of observations from 
individuals who bid less than 230 in at least one period.  Lastly, the Winners group 
contains observations from those individuals selected to contract with the E.P.D. in 
period 5.  Separating the results into these groups allows for a comparison of the bid 
inflation level among those participants who’s implied values were below + for the entire 
2001 auction (Group 1) with the level for the group of individuals who’s implied values 
were below + in at least one period of the auction, as well as with the level of those 
participants who ultimately entered into irrigation suspension contracts.  Mean bid 
inflation estimates in Group 1 range from $38.62 in the first period to $7.32 in the final 
period.  For Group 2, estimates range from $62.66 in period 1 to $5.96 in period 5.  In the 
Winners group, the mean estimates of bid inflation range from $62.59 in period 1 to 
$6.13 in period 5.  The similarity of results between Group 2 and the Winners group is 
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inescapable since the Winners group is a subset of Group 2 sharing 208 out of 214 
observations.   
Table 20. Bid Inflation by Period 
  Group 1:  Group 2:    Winners   
Period v < 230 in all periods v<230 in some period  
  (158 Observations) (214 Observations)   (208 Observations)   
Bid inflation = ( bid - minimum implied value) 
1 38.62 62.66 62.59 
2 18.50 30.92 30.37 
3 10.02 13.74 13.55 
4 9.29 10.27 10.51 
5 7.32 5.96 6.13 
Mean individual inflation percentage= Mean [(bid - minimum value)/minimum value]  
1 41.23% 58.77% 59.60% 
2 24.23% 31.58% 31.83% 
3 16.81% 17.15% 17.38% 
4 16.92% 16.20% 16.64% 
5 15.18% 13.12% 13.50% 
Mean inflation percentage= Mean (bid-minimum value) / Mean (minimum value) 
1 32.47% 48.64% 49.61% 
2 15.55% 24.00% 24.07% 
3 8.42% 10.67% 10.74% 
4 7.81% 7.97% 8.33% 
5 6.15% 4.63% 4.86% 
 
The mean individual inflation percentage is calculated for each of the five auction 
periods  = 1, … ,5 and for each subgroup in accordance with the following formula: 
J	 	
 
	 6	@ =  A1*B C( @ − %%% D )/%%% D 
E
 "#  
This measure of inflation captures the mean percentage above their underlying value by 
which individual’s bid in each round.  Group 1 estimates range from a high of 41.23% in 
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period 1 to 15.18% in period 5.  This may be compared with Group 2 estimates which 
range from 58.77% in period 1 to 13.12% in period 5.  In the Winners group, percent 
inflation falls from a high of 59.60% in period 1 to a low of 13.50% in round 5.  The 
mean individual inflation percentage for each group in all five periods of the 2001 
auction is shown in Figure 12.  In all groupings, the percentage of inflation falls in each 
successive period of the auction, thus implying efficiency gains to repeated bidding 
rounds.  It appears as though some farmers start out bidding far above their values and 
then realize they are going to leave money on the table unless they revise their bids 
downward toward their true values.  High levels of bid inflation in the early rounds are 
substantial and economically significant, as the total dollar expenditure on irrigation 
services in 2001 was about $4.5 million.  By contrast, in the later periods 4 and 5, these 
levels of bid inflation are lower in each group as the competitive forces of the auction 
mechanism drive bids closer to underlying values.   
 
Figure 12. Mean Individual Inflation Percentage 
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One potential problem with the previous measure of inflation stems from the fact 
that individual observations with unusually high percentages of inflation coupled with 
low minimum implied values could bias the mean individual inflation percentage 
upwards and not accurately characterize the auction’s performance in terms of how well 
the mechanism keeps average premium payouts close to average underlying values.  In 
response to this problem, we construct another measure of the inflation percentage called 
the mean inflation percentage. 
The mean inflation percentage is calculated for each period in accordance with the 
following formula: 
J	 
	 6	@ =  L1*M   @−%%% D E "#L1*M  %%% D E "#  
This measure of inflation captures the mean size of the premium by which individual’s 
bid above their underlying value with respect to the mean underlying value for all auction 
participants.  The measure is different from the mean individual inflation percentage 
reported previously in that it divides the mean individual inflation by the mean minimum 
value implied by all bidders, rather than dividing each individual’s bid inflation by their 
own implied value.  Therefore this measure provides a better description of the overall 
performance of the auction mechanism, in terms of the amount by which payments (bids) 
exceeded minimum implied values.  The results of this measure are presented in Table 20 
and graphically in Figure 13 for Group 1, Group 2, and the Winners group.  The mean 
inflation percentage is lower than the mean individual inflation percentage in each group 
and period, ranging from 32.47% for Group 1 in period 1 to 6.15% in Group 1 for period 
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5.  Group 2 estimates range from 48.64% in period 1 to 4.63% in period 5.  Lastly, the 
Winners group estimates range from 49.61% in period 1 to 4.86% in period 5.  Again, 
these premiums are of significant size and substantial amount considering the total dollar 
expenditure of about $4.5 million in 2001. 
 
Figure 13. Mean Inflation Percentage 
 
Another important question to address is how bidders change their behavior over 
time in the 2001 auction.  Table 21 reports results from an OLS regression of implied 
value on auction period using fixed effects.  More formally, %N
 	
 =
H#(@).  The results indicate a significant and substantial downward trend in 
implied values over time.  For Group 1 observations, the effect is -$7.94/acre per period.  
The effects in Group 2 and the Winners groups are even larger at -$14.02/acre per period 
and -$13.90 per period, respectively.  The adjusted r-squared is 0.80 for Group 1, 0.73 for 
Group 2, and 0.71 for the Winners group. 
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Table 21. Implied Value Results Using OLS with Subject Fixed Effects 
  Group 1 Group 2 Winners 
period -7.94 -14.02 -13.90 
(17.99)* (22.29)* (21.77)* 
const 157.85 194.23 191.12 
(107.80)* (93.13)* (90.21)* 
R² 0.80 0.73 0.71 
*Absolute t-ratios are significant at the a=.01 level 
 
To further investigate bidding behavior over time in these auctions, it will be 
helpful to isolate the effect of new information on individual bidding behavior.  In Table 
22, the differences in mean implied values across periods, calculated as L#EM FD @ −
D (@H#) , are shown for all auction participants.  These differences are also computed for 
subgroups of individuals which are separated according to whether they received a 
provisional acceptance or rejection in the previous auction period.  For all observations, 
the mean implied value fell at a decreasing rate in successive periods.  On average, the 
implied values in period 2 are $26.84 per acre lower than the implied values in period 1, 
whereas the implied values in period 5 are only $1.27 per acre lower than the implied 
values in period 4.  Focusing on differences in implied values across time conditional on 
whether a bid was provisionally accepted or rejected shows a clear divergence in bidding 
behavior as participants respond to new information.  Implied values do not appear to 
change in a clear direction in the subsequent period when a bid is provisionally accepted.  
The change in implied value from one period to the next when a provisional acceptance is 
received is on average negative ($-1.46 and -$3.12) for periods 3 vs. 2 and periods 4 vs. 
3, and on average positive ($.47 and $2.46) for periods 2 vs. 1 and periods 5 vs. 4.  There 
is however a clear propensity for individuals to revise their bids downward as a response 
  
to a provisional rejection.  In this case, average implied values fall at a decreasing rate in 
each period, from an average change of 
change of -3.42 between periods 5 vs. 4.  These changes are illustrated in
Table 22. Implied Values Changing with New Information
    Mean [v(t) 
All Obser
      
      
Period 2 vs Period 1:** -
Period 3 vs Period 2:** -
Period 4 vs Period 3:* 
Period 5 vs Period 4:** 
                    *2 group mean comparison tests show the means for the winners and losers are 
                    significantly different at the a=.01* and a=.05** levels
 
 
Figure 14. Implied Values Changing with New 
 
 
-$31.66 between periods 2 vs. 1 to an average 
 
- v(t-1)]   Mean [v(t) - v(t-1)]   Mean [v(t) 
vations Provisional winners  Provisional losers 
    in the prior period   in the prior period
(N)     (N)   
26.84 (333) 0.47 (50) 
13.60 (333) -1.46 (82) 
-5.93 (333) -3.12 (120) 
-1.27 (333) 2.46 (122) 
 
 
Information 
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- v(t-1)] 
 
 
  (N) 
-31.66 (283) 
-17.57 (251) 
-7.51 (213) 
-3.42 (211) 
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Another factor of interest is whether or not permit size influences the amount of 
bid inflation.  If a landowner is successful in contracting with the E.P.D., then the 
nominal amount of the gain received is increasing as permit size increases, holding the 
amount of bid inflation constant. 
More formally: 
O	  
	 =  N% 3P ∗ ( –  	
) 
(O	)(N% 3P) = ( − 	
) > 0 
If farmers have some degree of loss aversion, then we may expect to observe smaller 
levels of bid inflation as permit size increases.  Also, when single individuals own 
multiple permits which are bid in the auction, we may expect to see a higher level of bid 
inflation across those permits as they are able to construct a portfolio of bids to reduce the 
risk of failing to contract at a price above their value (and hence losing out on a potential 
windfall).  Alternatively, we might observe that multiple permit holders behave as if they 
have a larger amount of total acreage at stake, in which case, we may again expect to see 
smaller levels of bid inflation.  These arguments are constructed into the following 
testable hypotheses: 
Size Hypothesis: Larger parcels will have lower levels of per-acre bid inflation. 
Portfolio Hypothesis: Multiple parcels bid by a single owner will have higher levels of 
bid inflation. 
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Panel regression using random effects of bid inflation on period, permit size (Acres), the 
number of other permits offered in the auction by the same bidder (Otherpermits), and a 
squared term to capture the curvature of the Otherpermits term are reported in Table 23 
for Groups 1, 2, and the Winners.   The equation estimated is as follows: 
(, @ − -	
 @) = 	 + ,# @ + ,.563 @ + 
,1RℎN%3 @ + ,SRℎN%3 @. +  @    
As before, there is a major and statistically significant effect of period on the level of 
inflation.  However, the results of both of the above hypothesis tests are insignificant.  
The coefficient on Acres is negative indicating that there may be a lower level of bid 
inflation for larger permits, but without statistical significance these results are 
inconclusive.  The z-statistics for Otherpermits are even smaller than those on acreage 
and the directional effect changes across groups, indicating that bids on multiple 
contracts may not be constructed differently from those of single parcel owners.  The low 
significance levels of these effects are also apparent in the low between r-squared of 
.0052, .0097, and .0111 for Group 1, Group 2, and the Winners, respectively.   
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Table 23. Bid Inflation Results Using Panel Regression with Random Effects 
Bid Inflation = (bid-minimum value) 
    Group 1 Group 2 Winners 
Period -7.181 -13.405 -13.28 
(17.01)* (21.50)* (20.97)* 
Acres -.0012 -.0150 -.01428 
(.14) (1.32) (1.25) 
Otherpermits .3804 -.7037 -1.1189 
(.22) (.31) (.49) 
Otherpermits2 -.1647 .0272 .0552 
(.55) (.07) (.14) 
constant 38.78 68.08 67.89 
(15.33)* (20.53)* (20.24)* 
Within r-squared .31 .35 .35 
Between r-squared .0052 .0097 .0111 
*Absolute z-statistics are significant at the a=.1* and a=.01** levels 
 
In addition to looking at the behavior of those participant’s whom we believe to 
be formulating “plausible” bids and thus revealing values that are within our 
hypothesized range of +, we also consider the bidding behavior of all 2001 auction 
participants together as well as the separate behavior of those participants who made 
implausible bids.  Figure 15 shows a plot of implied value densities in periods 1 and 5 for 
all bids excluding one observation of $8,000 per acre.17  There is a clear leftward shift of 
the entire distribution as individuals reduce their level of inflation from period 1 to period 
5.   
                                                 
17 This observation was excluded from all graphs for the sake of scale and convenience.  It appears as 
though the individual who bid $8000 per acre to suspend their irrigation in all five periods of the 2001 
auction was registering a protest to the auction and did not have any expectation of contracting with the 
E.P.D.   
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Figure 15. Implied Value Distribution Between Periods 1 and 5 for All Bids 
 
Figure 16 shows the implied value distributions in all periods for observations 
which were above + in period 1 (above +, the implied value is assigned to be equal to bid 
since bids are predicted to approach values as they rise to the level of +).  The graphs in 
Figure 16 appear to be shifting leftward as participants reduce their level of inflation.  
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Figure 16. Implied Value Distributions Across Periods for Implausible Bids 
 
 This leftward shift may be more easily identified by comparing the densities from 
periods 1 and 5 for those values which were above + in period 1 as shown in Figure 17.   
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Figure 17. Implied Values in Period 1 Versus Period 5 for Implausible Bids 
 
Kolmogrov-Smirnov tests for the equality of distributions for these bids across all 
five periods are reported in Table 24.  It is clear from the table that participants 
significantly lower their bids in periods 1 through 3, while the distributions stabilize in 
periods 4 and 5.   
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Table 24. Kolmogrov-Smirnov Tests for Equality of Distributions 
 
    Period 1 vs Period 5 
D P-Value Corrected 
Combined K-S 0.349 0.000 0.000 
 
Period 1 vs Period 2 
D P-Value Corrected 
Combined K-S 0.194 0.003 0.002 
Period 
Period 2 vs Period 3 
D P-Value Corrected 
Combined K-S 0.189 0.004 0.003 
Period 
Period 3 vs Period 4 
D P-Value Corrected 
Combined K-S 0.103 0.313 0.269 
Period 
Period 4 vs Period 5 
D P-Value Corrected 
Combined K-S 0.057 0.938 0.920 
 
Next, we examine the relative performance of different institutions by comparing 
the amounts bid in 2002 with the minimum implied values from 2001 on the 212 parcels 
which were offered in both auctions.  The 2002 auction results for parcels bid in both 
years are summarized in Table 25.  Looking at the table, it is apparent that there was a 
divergence in behavior for parcels that entered plausible and implausible bids in 2001 
(those which implied a value above and below +).  The mean 2002 bid inflation is 
calculated as follows: 
J	 2002 , 
	 =  A1*B C2002 , − %%% D 
E
 "#  
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The mean 2002 bid inflation for the 172 plausibly bid parcels from 2001 which were also 
bid in 2002 is $.55 per acre.  This may be compared with a mean 2002 bid inflation of -
$238.09 for the 40 implausibly bid parcels from 2001 which were also bid in 2002.  The 
large disparity in 2002 bid inflation between parcels which received plausible versus 
implausible bids in 2001 provides further evidence that bids exceeding + in 2001 were 
simply protests to the auction institution.  It appears as though some individuals who 
protested the auction in 2001 decided that the money they left on the table by not bidding 
plausibly was worth more than the benefit gained from drastically overbidding.  Indeed, 
several individuals reduced their bids from $1000 per acre in 2001 to less than the $150 
per acre maximum reserve in 2002.   
Table 25. 2002 Results for Parcels Bid in Both Years 
      Plausible in 2001       Implausible in 2001 
(v<230) (v>230) 
      N=172       N=40 
Mean Bid Inflation $0.55 -$238.09 
(min , max) (-$145.91 , $103) (-$862.50 , -$93.02) 
Mean Individual Inflation Percentage 19.45% -57.26% 
(min , max) (-66.35% , 566.67%) (-86.25% , -38.60%) 
Mean Inflation Percentage  0.42% -63.45% 
 
Mean individual inflation and mean inflation percentages are calculated using the 
same formulas presented earlier with 2002 bids in place of those from 2001.  In 
percentage terms, the 2002 auction outperformed the 2001 action with a mean inflation 
percentage of 0.42% for plausible parcels.  This estimate is lower than those found in the 
literature for other auction mechanisms and supports the theoretical proposition from 
McAfee and McMillan and Latacz-Lohmann and Hamsvoort that implementing a 
87 
 
 
 
maximum reserve price improves auction performance.  It is also below the lowest 
previous estimates of bid inflation in the Conservation Reserve Program by Kirwan, et al.   
Finally, we look at how the auction mechanism compares in performance to a 
suite of hypothetical fixed payment mechanisms.  If a bidder has revealed a value during 
the auction which is equal to or below the fixed payment, then we assume that they 
would participate in a fixed payment scheme and earn a premium equal to the following:  
%% U% U; 	<% = 	<% − -	
 
Therefore, the participation constraint in a fixed payment scheme is as follows: 
V (	<% − -	
) > 0                , 566N 4	6 ℎ ℎ W. . X.                       Rℎ3                                                 ,   X′  4	6 ℎ ℎ W. . X.Y 
Table 26 compares potential fixed payment outcomes in 2001 using our knowledge of the 
underlying implied value distribution.  In order to contract 33,006 acres (a total amount 
of acreage similar to the amount contracted in the 2001 auction of 33,101), the E.P.D. 
would have been required to offer farmers $200 per acre.  At that fixed price, the total 
expenditure would have been $6,601,200.  This represents a 64.15% higher per acre 
expenditure than the actual expenditure achieved in the 2001 discriminatory price 
auction.  Moreover, it is important to note that the conservation agent may not have 
enough prior knowledge of the underlying value distribution to allow for the optimal 
choice of fixed payment in any given procurement scenario. 
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Table 26. Potential Fixed Payment Outcomes 
Fixed Price  Total  Total   Fixed Price  Total  Total 
Per Acre Acres  Payment   Per Acre Acres  Payment 
$75 2093 $156,975 $165 25765 $4,251,225 
$80 2093 $167,440 $170 25855 $4,395,350 
$85 2093 $177,905 $175 26632 $4,660,600 
$90 2093 $188,370 $180 26948 $4,850,640 
$95 3739 $355,205 $185 27120 $5,017,200 
$100 6673 $667,300 $190 27597 $5,243,430 
$105 7157 $751,485 $195 27713 $5,404,035 
$110 8818 $969,980 $200 33006 $6,601,200 
$115 10516 $1,209,340 $205 33006 $6,766,230 
$120 13447 $1,613,640 $210 33232 $6,978,720 
$125 20141 $2,517,625 $215 33232 $7,144,880 
$130 22378 $2,909,140 $220 33273 $7,320,060 
$135 22667 $3,060,045 $225 33933 $7,634,925 
$140 23128 $3,237,920 $230 33933 $7,804,590 
$145 23940 $3,471,300 $235 34653 $8,143,455 
$150 25688 $3,853,200 $240 35088 $8,421,120 
$155 25688 $3,981,640 $245 35349 $8,660,505 
$160 25688 $4,110,080 $250 40035 $10,008,750 
 
Figure 18 and Figure 19 illustrate potential outcomes of fixed payment schemes in 
terms of acres contracted and total program costs for fixed payment programs ranging 
from $75 to $250 per acre.  
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Figure 18. Potential Acres Removed From Irrigation at Each Fixed Price Offer 
 
 
Figure 19. Potential Payments at Each Fixed Price Offer 
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The final section of the chapter will conclude with general remarks and 
discussion. 
Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
Accurate estimation of bid inflation levels in procurement auctions for 
environmental services is an issue of growing importance, as these kinds of auctions are 
becoming increasingly popular worldwide.  The amount by which auction participants are 
paid above their opportunity costs will either reduce the amount and quality of 
environmental services which may be contracted within a given budget, or increase the 
amount of public funds that must be collected through distortionary taxes in order to meet 
a particular environmental objective.  In addition to providing estimates of bid inflation in 
irrigation suspension auctions, this analysis increases our understanding of general 
conservation auctions by comparing performance characteristics under different rules.   
Estimates of bid inflation in the Georgia irrigation auctions are largely consistent 
with previous results from empirical studies of the CRP and experimental studies of first 
price discriminatory auctions, with the exception of the 2002 auction which shows lower 
inflation levels.  This implies that there may be a common level of inflation for different 
kinds of environmental services when similar auction institutions are used.  The lower 
variance of our estimates may be explained by the use of different estimation techniques 
or by the fact that only one service is at stake in the irrigation suspension auction rather 
than the suite of potential conservation services and land characteristics which factor into 
CRP bid scores.  These results indicate that the optimal choice of auction institution will 
likely be independent of the type of conservation service procured, so long as there is 
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sufficient heterogeneity across the opportunity costs of providers to motivate the use of 
an auction rather than a traditional fixed payment mechanism for procurement. 
With respect to auction rules, it appears as though the imposition of a $150 per 
acre maximum reserve in 2002 allowed for a reduction in the mean inflation percentage 
among plausible 2001 bidders from 4.63% in period five of 2001 to 0.42% in 2002.  The 
maximum reserve price chosen in 2002 is estimated to be 14.54% percent higher than the 
mean implied value of our subsample of plausible parcels bid in both years.  This gives 
empirical support to the theoretical claims of McAfee and McMillan and Latacz-
Lohmann and Hamsvoort that an appropriately chosen maximum reserve price may 
improve auction performance.   
Repeated rounds in the 2001 auction allow for the observation of changes in 
bidding behavior over time.  In each successive period of the 2001 auction, the mean 
value implied by participants’ bids falls about $8 ($14 dollars for those participants who 
lowered their bids to a level below + in at least one of the five periods).  When reactions 
to new information are incorporated in the time trend analysis, we find that auction 
participants do not significantly modify their bids upwards or downwards in response to a 
provisional acceptance in the previous period.  However, when bids are provisionally 
rejected in the prior period, participants reduce their bids by a decreasing amount over 
time.  These findings indicate that bid inflation may be reduced in auctions which are 
repeated over multiple signup periods, as winners leave their bids unchanged across time 
while losers reduce their bids to increase their probability of winning in future rounds.  
This empirical evidence of increasing efficiency from repetition of the auction process 
contradicts previous empirical findings from a study of the early signup periods of the 
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Conservation Reserve Programs.  Our findings also indicate a more efficient outcome of 
repetition in auctions than previous research using simulations of an agent based model 
with learning.  Of course, all five periods of the 2001 irrigation suspension auction 
occurred in the same afternoon, so the ability of each participant to learn from any other’s 
experience was limited by time.   
As far as testing the behavior of large landholders versus small, we find negative 
but statistically insignificant effects of parcel size on bidding behavior.  This would 
indicate that the auction participants do not demonstrate a large degree of loss aversion.  
Regression results looking for portfolio effects which might arise from bidding more than 
one parcel in the auction are also inconclusive.   
Finally, we find that the 2001 auction yielded a 64.15% improvement in the 
procurement outcome over the optimal standard fixed payment protocol in that year.  
While this result does not account for higher administrative costs from conducting an 
auction instead of a fixed payment scheme, it does reveal a substantial and economically 
significant reduction in per-acre payments to contract holders.  Moreover, the auction 
mechanism was implemented by the E.P.D. without perfect knowledge of the distribution 
of the value of irrigation across permit holders.  It is unlikely that the E.P.D. would have 
been able to choose the optimal fixed payment price before implementing such a 
program.  Therefore, the disparity in actual performance between the two institutions 
could have been much greater. 
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Appendix A: Sample Screenshots from the Regulatory Threat Experiment 
 
This Appendix contains sample screenshots of the High Budget Auction 
Treatment bidding phase, Regular Auction Treatment review phase, and subject 
questionnaire from the experiments on procurement auctions under regulatory threat. 
 
Figure 20. Subject Review Screen After Period 1 
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Figure 21. High Budget Treatment Bidding Screen 
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Figure 22. Subject Questionnaire Screenshot 
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Appendix B: Instructions for the Regulatory Threat Experiment 
 
This Appendix contains complete written subject instructions for the Regulatory 
Threat experiment.  Subjects were able to keep the relevant instructions at their computer 
for the duration of each treatment.  Additionally, there were summaries of key points 
from the instructions on the computer screen during the experiment and the experimenter 
discussed the instructions aloud before each bidding session.  Except for details of 
pagination, the instructions are presented below are the same as those seen by actual 
subjects. 
General Background 
 
Welcome.  Thank you for participating in today’s experiment. 
It is important that you remain silent until you are told it is ok to ask questions. 
In this experiment each of you are going to be sellers of a fictitious commodity in a 
sequence of auctions.  There are 11 sellers in each auction. 
In addition to earning $3 for showing up and participating, you will have the potential to 
earn more money based on the results of the auctions.  There are three types of auctions.  
The rules of each type of auction will be explained in detail later.  Each type of auction 
will be repeated more than once.  At the end of the experiment, one period for each of the 
three auction types will be chosen at random for final payout.  These selections will be 
made in plain view at the front of the laboratory using a bingo cage.  You will be paid 
$1.00 for each point that you earn in those 3 auctions.  How points are earned in each 
auction period will be explained in detail later.  
To summarize, your earnings today will consist of $3 for participating plus $1.00 for each 
point you earn in three randomly selected auction periods.   
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Regular (R) Auction Instructions 
 
In each period, you will play the role of seller in an auction and will be given a randomly 
drawn value for your commodity.  Your value will be between 3 and 10.   You and the 
other 10 sellers in the auction will each have an equal chance of having a value of 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9, or 10.  Values are drawn randomly for every seller, so it will be possible for 
two or more sellers to have the same value.  There will be a new value draw in each 
period. 
Your task in each period is to enter a bid between 1 and 20 to try to sell your commodity.   
• If your bid is accepted, then you will earn points for the period equal to your bid.   
• If your bid is rejected, then you will earn points for the period equal to your 
commodity 
             value.   
 
Recall that each point you earn is worth $1.00 if the period in which it is earned is chosen 
for final payoff at the end of the experiment.   
Acceptance Rules: 
The computer’s role is to order all bids from lowest to highest and to accept only the 
lowest six bids in every period.  Again, the computer will only accept the lowest six 
bids in each period.   If there is a tie for the 6th lowest bid, then the computer will 
randomly choose to accept one of the tied bids.   
Therefore, there are two possible scenarios that may occur in the Regular auction: 
Scenario 1: You submit a bid between 1 and 20 to sell your commodity and your bid is 
accepted (because it was one of the lowest six bids).  When your bid is accepted, you will 
earn the number of points equal to your bid for the period. 
Scenario 2: You submit a bid between 1 and 20 to sell your commodity and your bid is 
rejected (because it was not one of the lowest six bids).  When your bid is rejected, you 
will earn the number of points equal to your commodity value for the period. 
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This is the end of the written instructions for the Regular auction.  If you have a question 
at this time, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to give you an 
answer.   
You will see a brief summary of the instructions during the auction periods.   
If you have a question during the auctions, please raise your hand and the experimenter 
will come to give you an answer. 
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High Budget (H) Auction Instructions 
The High Budget auctions will be similar to the previous Regular auctions except for one 
very important difference.   
• In the High Budget auction, there is a possibility of an intervention.  If 
an intervention occurs, then everyone will earn zero points for the 
period. 
 
In each period, you will play the role of seller in an auction and will be given a randomly 
drawn value for your commodity.  Your value will be between 3 and 10.   You and the 
other 10 sellers in the auction will each have an equal chance of having a value of 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9, or 10.  Values are drawn randomly for every seller, so it will be possible for 
two or more sellers to have the same value.  There will be a new value draw in each 
period. 
Your task in each period is to enter a bid between 1 and 20 to try to sell your commodity. 
• If your bid is accepted, then you will earn points for the period equal to 
your bid.   
• If your bid is rejected, then you will earn points for the period equal to 
your commodity value, unless an intervention occurs, in which case all 
bids are rejected and everyone will earn zero points for the period.   
 
Recall that each point you earn is worth $1.00 if the period in which it is earned is chosen 
for final payoff at the end of the experiment.   
Acceptance Rules: 
The computer’s roles are to order all bids from lowest to highest and to determine 
whether or not an intervention occurs. 
• Intervention will occur if the lowest six bids add up to a number greater than 
the High Budget.    
 
• The High Budget is a randomly drawn number between 36 and 40.  This 
means that there is an equal chance that the High Budget is 36, 37, 38, 39, or 
40. 
 
• Important: When intervention occurs, all bids are rejected and everyone 
earns zero points for the period. 
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If no intervention occurs, then point earnings are awarded in the same way they were in 
Regular (R) auctions.  Recall from earlier that when your bid was one of the six lowest, 
then it was accepted and you earned points for the period equal to your bid.  When your 
bid was not one of the six lowest, then it was rejected and you earned points for the 
period equal to your commodity value.   
Therefore, there are three possible scenarios that may occur in the High Budget auction. 
Scenario 1: You submit a bid between 1 and 20 to sell your commodity and your bid is 
accepted (because it was one of the six lowest and there is no intervention).  When your 
bid is accepted, you will earn the number of points equal to your bid for the period. 
Scenario 2: You submit a bid between 1 and 20 to sell your commodity and your bid is 
rejected (because it was not one of the six lowest).  When your bid is rejected and there 
is no intervention, you will earn the number of points equal to your commodity value for 
the period. 
Scenario 3: You submit a bid between 1 and 20 to sell your commodity and your bid is 
rejected (because the six lowest bids added up to a number greater than the High Budget 
and there was an intervention).  When intervention occurs, everyone’s bid is rejected 
and everyone will earn zero points for the period. 
For illustration purposes only, consider the following examples: 
 Example 1 
The six lowest bids in a period turn out to be 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, and 20.  In this 
case, the sum of the lowest six bids 20+20+20+20+20+20 = 120 is greater than 
the High Budget, since the High Budget is a randomly chosen number between 
36 and 40.  There would be an intervention and all bidders would earn zero 
points for the period. 
Example 2 
The six lowest bids in a period turn out to be 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, and 1.  In this case, the 
sum of the lowest six bids 1+1+1+1+1+1 = 6 is less than the High Budget, since 
the High Budget is a randomly chosen number between 36 and 40.  There would 
not be an intervention.   If your bid was accepted, then you would earn points for 
the period equal to your bid (here, all six low bidders would earn 1 point for the 
period).  If your bid was rejected, then you would earn points for the period equal 
to your commodity value. 
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This is the end of the written instructions for the High Budget auction.  If you have a 
question at this time, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to give you 
an answer. 
 You will also see a brief summary of the instructions during the auction periods.   
If you have a question during the auctions, please raise your hand and the experimenter 
will come to give you an answer. 
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Low Budget (L) Auction Instructions 
The Low Budget auctions will be similar to the previous High Budget auctions except for 
one very important difference.   
• The Low Budget is smaller than the High Budget. 
The Low Budget is a randomly drawn number between 26 and 30. 
In each period, you will play the role of seller in an auction and will be given a randomly 
drawn value for your commodity.  Your value will be between 3 and 10.   You and the 
other 10 sellers in the auction will each have an equal chance of having a value of 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9, or 10.  Values are drawn randomly for every seller, so it will be possible for 
two or more sellers to have the same value.  There will be a new value draw in each 
period. 
Your task in each period is to enter a bid between 1 and 20 to try to sell your commodity. 
• If your bid is accepted, then you will earn points for the period equal to 
your bid.   
• If your bid is rejected, then you will earn points for the period equal to 
your commodity value, unless an intervention occurs, in which case all 
bids are rejected and everyone will earn zero points for the period.   
 
Recall that each point you earn is worth $1.00 if the period in which it is earned is chosen 
for final payoff at the end of the experiment.   
Acceptance Rules: 
The computer’s roles are to order all bids from lowest to highest and to determine 
whether or not an intervention occurs. 
• Intervention will occur if the lowest six bids add up to a number greater than 
the Low budget.    
 
• The Low Budget is a randomly drawn number between 26 and 30.  This 
means that there is an equal chance that the Low Budget is 26, 27, 28, 29, or 
30. 
 
• Important: When intervention occurs, all bids are rejected and everyone 
earns zero points for the period. 
 
If no intervention occurs, then point earnings are awarded in the same way they were in 
Regular (R) auctions.  Recall from earlier that when your bid was one of the six lowest, 
then it was accepted and you earned points for the period equal to your bid.  When your 
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bid was not one of the six lowest, then it was rejected and you earned points for the 
period equal to your commodity value.   
Therefore, there are three possible scenarios that may occur in the Low Budget auction. 
Scenario 1: You submit a bid between 1 and 20 to sell your commodity and your bid is 
accepted (because it was one of the six lowest and there is no intervention).  When your 
bid is accepted, you will earn the number of points equal to your bid for the period. 
Scenario 2: You submit a bid between 1 and 20 to sell your commodity and your bid is 
rejected (because it was not one of the six lowest).  When your bid is rejected and there 
is no intervention, you will earn the number of points equal to your commodity value for 
the period. 
Scenario 3: You submit a bid between 1 and 20 to sell your commodity and your bid is 
rejected (because the six lowest bids added up to a number greater than the Low Budget 
and there was an intervention).  When intervention occurs, everyone’s bid is rejected 
and everyone will earn zero points for the period. 
For illustration purposes only, consider the following examples: 
 Example 1 
The six lowest bids in a period turn out to be 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, and 20.  In this 
case, the sum of the lowest six bids 20+20+20+20+20+20 = 120 is greater than 
the Low Budget, since the Low Budget is a randomly chosen number between 26 
and 30.  There would be an intervention and all bidders would earn zero points for 
the period. 
Example 2 
The six lowest bids in a period turn out to be 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, and 1.  In this case, the 
sum of the lowest six bids 1+1+1+1+1+1 = 6 is less than the Low Budget, since 
the Low Budget is a randomly chosen number between 26 and 30.  There would 
not be an intervention.   If your bid was accepted, then you would earn points for 
the period equal to your bid (here, all six low bidders would earn 1 point for the 
period).  If your bid was rejected, then you would earn points for the period equal 
to your commodity value. 
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This is the end of the written instructions for the Low Budget auction.  If you have a 
question at this time, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to give you 
an answer. 
 You will also see a brief summary of the instructions during the auction periods.   
If you have a question during the auctions, please raise your hand and the experimenter 
will come to give you an answer. 
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